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Sociologists and economists have different conceptions of economic 
action. For sociologists, economic action is intertwined with social 
action. For economists, economic action is separable and can be abstracted 
from social action. In this paper, with the help of empirical study, I 
shall demonstractehow social considerations are interwoven with economic 
action. The present study uses the concept of 'trust' to see how economic 
action is embedded in the social world. Through critical reading of the 
writings of Granovetter, Luhmann and Zucker, a model of trust is developed'. 
The model is then applied to make sense of the relation between the banking 
and the manufacturing sector. On the whole, the banking sector contributes 
little capital to the manufacturing sector relative to other sectors. In 
particular, small factories find lt difficult to obtain bank finance. It is 
a situation that needs explanation for it seems that bankers have 
disregarded a potential market. In -this investigation it is suggested that 
the local manufacturers are not 'trustworthy' from bankers' point of view. 
It is not easy for them to meet bankers' cr:i:teria of 'trustworthiness' and 
hence unable to .get loans. The implication of this for the future of 
manufacturing and the theoretical potency., of the concept of 'trust' will 
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I. THE QUERY 
Any serious account of the Hong Kong economy should have an agenda 
for the free market. The low level of government intervention in economy 
is a plain fact. Apart from medical and health services, public housing 
and education that witness heavy government intervention,government's 
control and directives do not extend to most part of the economy. In 
practice, the government does not control interest rates, nor offer 
. proprietor funds, nor provide p~eferential loans to industry.' The 
government does not actively formulate goals-and directives to lead 
economic development. The 'center of gravity' of the Hong Kong economy 
rest on the free market rather than the government. 
For such Asian countries as South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, the 
developmental states play much more significant roles in economic 
development. Any serious discussion of the developmentalexperiences~ of 
these countries should consider the role of government. In Hong Kong, 
that is not the case. The statist argument proposed by some Asian 
" 
scholars is ~9t useful in Hong Kong (for statist argument, see Amseden 
1979, Cumming ' 1987, Deyo 1987, Gold 1979, Skocpol 1979, 1985). Although 
we may investigate the sectors that witness marked government 
intervention, most of the economic phenomena are away from it. We m~y 
also investigate why the government refrains itself from intervening 
into the economy, but ~gain, this leaves the core questions unanswered • . 
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If empiricial studies should be guided by conceptual frameworks, 
Hong Kong sociology students will be disoriertted ' by the present state of . 
theoretical development because a sociological theori of free market is 
yet to appear. When we look for a sociological (not economistic) theory 
of free market, we can only find some piece meal discussions. It is not 
surprising because such a perspective calls for some form of mediation 
of the reasoning of ,economics and sociology. It involves bridging the 
dive~gentbasic assumptions of sociology and economics. It will not be 
an easy task. However, in the long run, we need a new theoretical model 
to capture t"he subtleties of the free market in Hong Kong. 
Although a vigorous sociological theory for the operation of the 
free market is lacking, ,sociologists have their own conception of the 
free market economy. What are the differences in the conception of the 
free market economy between the economists and sociologists? InSwedberg 
et a1 (1987), the differences are rooted in their disparate conceptions 
I 
of action. Owing to the differences, the two schools have their own 
approaches . in various derived problems. The reverse is also true: the 
different stances in the various issues commonly lead to the problem of 
action. 
Swedberg et al (1987) identified four important features of the 
market economy from the economists poin~ o~ ' , viewl. Firstly,the actors 
are ,atomized utility maximizers. They are separate fundamentally from 
'.) 
" 
one another,and interact with each other through the market mechanisms 
in the acts of buying and selling. That is to say, the 'economic actors' 
are separate from, the social actors. Economic , actors need not (and 
should not) consider any soc"ial aspects of interaction. In this view, 
lItis the typology proposed 'by Swedberg et al 1987. The original one has three, 
more items. I ' find it irrelevant here. They ' are suppressed here. 
not only do the social ties among actors play no positive role, but they 
are also viewed as frictional drags to transactions~ 
Secondly, according to neo-classical economics, economic action 
takes place in its own separate space. The "'hypothetical market' is " 
detached from the wider society. Transactions happen in the sheathed 
environment so that the influences of other social institutions can be 
/ disregarded. 
Thirdly, they assume formal rationality. In its most elementary 
formulation, 'rationality' means that the firms and the households are 
utility maxinilzers. It assumes that full information for making decision 
is possible. It also implies thatactor~ may n9t be blinded by other 
considerations if the utility is large enough. 
Finally, the result of individual acti6ns is a general equilibrium 
among the actors. Moreover, the . equilibrium is harmonic and mutually 
beneficial with respect , to the actors (Swedberg 1987:173-183). 
The above four issues, in short, are core assumption of economic 
action. For neo-classical theorists, economic action is rational and 
separate from the wider social context. The result of individual action 
is a harmonic equilibrium in the market. 
Sociologists" think in a different way. They find that in reali"ty, 
economic acto"rs rarely think seriously of marginality in making 
decisions. In addition, actors are rarely" atomized. Rather, they are 
linked with o~e another by various ties. Moreover, economic action is 
found to be embedded in the wider social context - it may be the 
structure of" social relations, political structure, and culture. The 
results of individual actions may not be a harmonic equilibrium, It may 
be a tension-filled 'mutual deterrence' or 'balance of power' rather 
than a , mutually beneficial. equilibrium. 
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Sociologists have some knowledge of the free ,market. Nevertheless, 
they fail to offer a systematic model to ' describe it as the economists 
"do. While the economists build their model with a confined amount of 
concepts, e.g., marginality, rationality and utility, sociological 
,writings on the market are fragmented. The so-called 'sociological 
conception of market' is in fact an amalgam of many unrelated works. Can 
we find some sociological concepts that can capture the operation of the 
market on the one hand and take int'o considerations of social variables 
on the other? 
How can sociology help to study economic phenomenon? Broadly 
speaking, there are' two strategies for sociological study of economic 
phenomenon. Firstly, social variables determine the goals of economic 
action. Some suggested that the attitudes toward economic life e.g. 
workaholic or laziness, consumerism or ascertism, are culturally 
I 
constructed and can be explained by social variables. A classic is 
Weber's study on Protestant ethics and the spirit of capitalism. This 
'. mode of thinking may, however, assume that actors will abide to the 
values and norms despite giving up the opportunities for make a fortune. 
Another strategy is to treat the 'social factors' as the building 
blocks of economic action. In formulating a course of action, -actors 
will consider not only 'where they goes', but also 'what available tools 
they can employ to lead ,them to· go'. It is the place where sociological 
concepts play'~_role (Swidler 1986). 
For example, when starting an illegal mobile kiosk, hawkers will 
not only calculate how much they can earn, but will also consider the 
probability of being caught. They have to develop strategies to minimize 
the impact or to totally get rid of it. They may, for- example, bribe a 
I 
policeman, or hire an agent to watch out for the police. 
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For economists·, all of these considerations ,are lumped together 
under the -concept of 'cost'. However, ttie ' bolts and nut~ of these 
considerations are still a black, boxZ. The point is, these intervening 
variables can be crucial. That is, whether one can .minimize .the 'cost' 
can be a determinant of profitability and business viability. Such 
elements can be a comparative advantage of an actor. One should note 
that the elements of 'cost' may not always come from the market. The 
cost is not a lump sum of stationery, rent, electricity and water, and 
wages. For dlf~erent actors, the cost may be varied. Undoubtedly, the 
cost of some items, eig~ electricity and gas, is fixed. Other items, 
however are not, such as the cost of hiring a team ·of loyal workers . by a 
. . 
subcontractor. Of course, the loyalty may come from the benefits offered 
by the subcontractors, but factors like friendship, ethnicity -etc. also 
matter. Even on the question of wages, not all workers charge their boss 
the same price. Some peo~le may accept a lower pay for various reasons 
e.g. helping a friend, working in a desired firm, etc. In these 
'. junctures social variables may play an important role in the process of 
realization of profit. ' 
In this study, these 'intervening considerations' will be 
highlighted to explain an economic phenomenon that -seems to violate the 
economic princfple. An underlying agenda is to try developing a 
sociological framework to explain economic action in a free market. 
The pheri?~enon we ' are studying h~re is the relation between the 
banking and the manufacturing sector in Hong Kong. It is an interesting· 
case because the manufacturing sector received very little credit from 
the banking sector. This is strange because manufacturing has been 
2The institutional economics, especially the work of O.E. Williamson is the 
attempt to handle these problems in an economistic approach (See Williamson 1981). 
5 
.'- " .. . , , . ' "' •. 
contributing a very high proportion of GDP in Hon~ Kong and it had been 
the most important sector in the economy until 1986. This cannot be 
explained by the underdevelopment of the banking sector for it has been 
experiencing unf~ttered growth since the end of the second world war, 
nor did the government's ,regulations on banking inhibit dealing with 
manufacturers (the details of this will be discussed in Chapter 1). Why 
the Hong Kong bankers~ who are free from governmental control 
(comparatively speaking), are so lukewarm in lending to the local 
manufacturers? 
This takes us to the second question: what are the sociological 
concepts th~t are , relevant for our inquiry? First of all, the query 
stated above can be pinned down to the problem of local bankers' lending 
behavior so that an anatomy of lending behavior may shed light on the 
query. 
It is obvious that', lending (of any form) requires a long period to 
complete the deal. From the day when the money is lent out 'to the time 
. of collecting the last dollar, it may take a couple of months. 
Sometimes, it may even ~ be a few decades. To ensure repayment, lenders 
should be able to predict the future conduct of borrowers. But how can 
one know the future ,conduct of others? The concept _of 'trust' will be 
useful here. Even by common sense, lending isa matter of trust. Terms 
associated with lending , more or less have some connections with trust. 
For example, 'credit' (which derives from ' the Latin 'to believe'), 
securities', insurance {which means to guarantee, to make safe), 
fiduciary, fidelity, guaranty etc. (Shapiro 1987:628). 'Trust' is 
important in the process of all economic exchange, but for lending, 
trust is particularly important. 
The full potential of trust cannot be known until we fully explore 
6 
the content of it. Some of its gimmicks can be revealed first. 
Firstly, trust presumes relations between things. 'Trust' have to 
be aiming at an object, otherwise , it does not make sense. We always 
, trust something or something makes us trust. It must also be conceived 
as a property of a collective unit (an on-going dyad, small groups or . 
other collectivities), not of isolated individuals. Being a collective 
attribute, trust is applicable to the -relations among people rather than 
to their psychological status taken ·individually (Lewis and Weigert 
1985a: 968). Unlike the neo-classical model, in trusting J actors are 
never atomized, they are situated in a specific social context. It 
denotes a form ' of relation between an actor ' and his environment. 
Does it mean that trust must be a concept to describe the 
phenomenon at the interpersonal level? Not exactly. In reality, we may 
experience that there are some social categories that are supposed to be 
trustworthy (or the oppos1i te), e. g. don't trust anyone over thirty. In 
these cases, the environment of the actor is not other concrete actors, 
~ but certain social categories. We may judge other people by their 
background i.e. social 'category, rather than personal attributes. Actors 
may not be so knowledg~able to make refined macro analysis, in their 
conceptual map, the ' events 'and categories noticed from news ,chattering, 
and common sense, will make them suspicious to certain social 
categories. We can conceive that the environment of actors is not only 
constituted b~-the concrete individual, ' rather, they also interact with 
other people in terms of c~tegbries (social, economic or political), 
even to some abstract events e.g. inflation. The 'categories' are part 
of actors' . environment. If it is the case, to trust (or to distrust) io-° 
categories is not ridiculous. 
The most important point is, trust enhance the latitude of action. 
7 
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By common sense, finding someone trustworthy means ,the trustee is a 
reliable agent of the truster. As in the ' case of merchandising trade, 
having secured one trustworthy agent in, for instance, Vietnam, means 
that the Vietnam market is accessible . . The point is, under capitalism, 
every individual is supposed to .rush for profit. For any knowledgeable 
persons, they will look for trustworthy agents (or think that the latter 
are ~trustworthy) to ensure that the investment will yield ~ return. 
These agents may include suppliers, buyers, partners, or even 
institutions. ~,rust can hence enhance the scope of discretion. The lack 
of trustworthy agents is a constraint. 
Through the concept of trust, we can see how actors are linked 
with one another. It is a conception of actor that is diametrically 
different from the economic view. It is a good entry point to 
investigate how 'social considerations' intervene in an economic 
transaction. Even within the free market, these considerations still 
matter. The question that follows is: why do we find some people (or 
. categories) more trustworthy than others? Economics cannot offer much 
insight here. Instead,in sociology, we are equipped with varieties of 
tools for this issue. 
TO .sum · up, through a study of lending behavior ' of the local 
bankers, how the 'intervening considerations' 'systematically screen out 
some possible alt~rnatives. It is a first step toward a sociological 
study of the 'f~~e market. 
I I. METHODOLOGY 
Three major sources of data are used in this study. The first one ' 
is from statistical data. Various government published statistical 
reports on the banking sector are used. The next one is the existing 
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literature. A search have been conducted to map dut the past debates on 
, j 
industrial financing and the manufacturing sector in Hong Kong. The 
third source comes from the interviews with bankers. This needs some 
elaboration. 
It needs to point out that in this study, there is no attempt to 
claim statistical representiveness. It is rather an exploratory 
research. Moreover, the focus is on bankers' considerations. It aims at 
revealing the bolts and nuts of bankers' calculations. Thus, instead of 
using structur,ed questionnairing, an unstructured interview is 
administrated to help explore the previously unknown terrain of bank 
lending. While the small sample size does not allows us to claim 
statistical representiveness, the procedure contributes to the 'depth' 
of our knowledge. 
The respondents came from snow ball sampling. At the end of each 
interview, the respondents were asked -to refer their work mates or 
friends to the investigator. Thi~ procedure was used because without 
referral, it is not likely that bankers would entertain an interview for 
one to two hours. Although the interviewees were mainly introduced by 
their work mates, the ' investig~tor had made every attempt to -cover the 
staff of all the major bank groups. The follqwing is a list of their 
position and the bank group they were working in. In this research, 
eleven bankers were interviewed. It was found that the stories presented 
by bankers do-not vary greatly. At this level, eleven cases is 
manageable yet fruitful. Nevertheless, we have to accept that ' some 
crucial information was almost impossible to obtain, for i~ entails the 
disclosure of information of clients. But this is a limitation that we 













LIST OF RESPONDENTS ' 
Assistant business manager of a large local Chinese bank 
Marketing team leader of a large American bank 
Marketing officer of a medium size local Chinese bank 
Credit analyst of a Japanese bank 
Office in business promotion department, in a medium size 
China bank 
Credit manager in a large local Chinese bank 
Credit operation manager of a large British bank 
Assistant manager of a Japanese bank 
Credit analyst of a large local Chinese bank 
Financial consultant of a large British bank 
Credit clerk in a medium size China bank 
Except two cases, all interviews were conducted in restaurants. 
Compare with their offices, it is the environment that makes the 
respondents feel relaxed. All interviews (except one', ' due to equipment 
failure) were taped. The l interviews ran at least forty five minutes. For 
some, it took up to two hours (three hours if the meal was included). 
Two major areas were explor-ed.The first one was, the lending 
procedure. It includes the lending policy and internal organization of 
the banks. ,The difficul'ties in lending come second. The investigator 
aimed at mapping . out in what , situations · the bankers would find it un~afe 
, . ' 
to lend, espec~ally to lend to manufacturers. :, It should be noted, that 
the 'official version' of lending was not an object ' here. Many probing 
questions wer~_used to uncover the 'insiders' stories. These insiders 
information contributes be the , core of the study. 
I used names like, , Peter' J 'David' etc. to denote the respondents 
instead of A, B" C etc. though'. they are not necessily the real names of 
"', the· respondents. In, this paper, respondents' names in a bracket e.g. 
'(Catherine), is used to identify their answers. Although all the 
bankers are well educated and they had no difficulties expressing their 
' 10 
ideas, some of them made it in a highly articulated (some were quips 
indeed) manner. These names will appear frequently in this paper. 
In chapter 1,a brief sketch of the Hong Kong banking system and 
-
the government regulatory framework will be provided to see whether it 
would cause difficulty for lending. Then the opinions of industrialists 
and bankers will be explored to see how their attitudes toward what the 
banks have done. A statistical analysis on allocations of loans and · 
advances will be conducted to obtain an overview of the sectoral 
distribution ~t loans. In chapter 2, the concept of trust in the 
writings ' of Luhmann, Zucker and Granovetterwill be discussed. In the 
third part, the two chapters on lending (ch~pte~ 3 and 4) will deal with 
the consideration of the bankers. In the last chapter, the 
trustworthiness of Hong Kong ' manuf~cturers will be investigated to see 
whether they can get advantage in obtaining ·bankfinancing. In the 
conclusion, the implications of the present study in making sense of the 
free market economy will be examinedi Reflections on economic sociology 




THE PROBLEM STATED 
How did the Hong Kong bankers serve manufacturers? Probing this 
question is to investigate whether one of the major supporting sector of 
industry, finance, works well to assist the industrial growth. It is 
interesting to find that even a large number of manufacturers may be 
their potential borrowers, the bankers are not particularlyint~rested 
in that market. 
In this chapter, I will first describe the Hong Kong banking 
system and relevant regulatory framework. Then, the grievances of 
industrialists and how the researches on Hong Kong industry 
support/oppose the industrialists' stance will be discussed. Finally, I 
. will present an analysis of the sectoral distribution of loans for use 
in Hong Kong to see how banks finance the manufacturing sector. It is 
found that the government has nO't imposed particular administrative " 
'constraints on ' bank lending. The banking system is expanding ·after . the 
Second World War. However, no matter some bankers asserted that they had 
done well to serve the ri'eeds ot-manufacturers, the latter found bankers' 
money difficul~ to borrow. Analysis of the sectoral distribution of 
loans for use in Hong Kong shows that ' the proportion of loans that the 
manufacturing sector received.is under-represented. The question is: why ' 
~_ bankers, - having abundant financial resources and free from 
administrative 'constraints, fail to accommodate manufac,turers? 
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I. THE BANKING SYSTEM AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
Although the banking system is said 'to be modern and well 
developed in Hong Kong, there is no specialized institution to cater for 
-' the needs of specific sectors. Regulations on bank are slack. On the 
whole, the government canndt make use of the financial system to 
implement her own economic policy unless some substantial changes are 
made. 
A. An Overview"" 
Before industrialization, Hong Kong was already a regional 
entrepot with robust trading capacity. As a legacy of Hong Kong entrepot 
histo'ry, a well developed ,commercial banking system was well established 
before industrialization. If in the early stage of industrialization, 
efficient banking services are an necessity, Hong Kong should be 
considered as lucky because even before- the Second World War, various 
means of payment and a fairly reliable monetary system had been 
~developed. The development of modern financial system preceded 
industrialization rather than the former pulled by the latter. Rarely 
did we find industrial development hindered by problems like 
insufficient currency supply and insufficient means of payment etc. that 
some developed countries faced at their early stages of 
industrialization (see Cameron 1969, especially the chapter on England). 
How could_banking contribute to industry? In the broadest sense, 
banks can contribute to industry in three ways. Firstly, financial 
institutions serve as intermediaries between savers and investor: they 
serve as reservoirs for the accumulated liquid savings of the community, 
and they direct' or allocate those savings among alternative investment 
opportunities. Secondly, financial institutions may supply part or all 
13 
the circulating media ·or means of payment. Finally, ,they may supply 
initiative for enterprises, as well as finance for the creation, 
transformation, and expansion of industrial and other ventures (Carneron 
, and Patrict 1969:7-9). In brief, they provide means of payment, assist 
capital formation, and provide entrepreneurial initiatives. 
In Hong Kong,institutions that carry banking functions are 
divided into three groups (i.e. the three tier system): the 'licensed 
banks, the restricted licensed banks' and the deposit taking companies. 
In this study, only the first category was explored for it forms the 
"' - ;' . 
major part of ,the banking industry. Besides, a substantial proportion of 
. the latter two categories are only the subsidiaries of licensed banks. 
Moreover, in terms of lending policy, the latter ~ two groups are not too 
different from the licensed banks. 
After the Second World War ,. the. banking sector experienced a very . 
I 
high growth rate. In terms of bank density (defined as the average 
number of bank offices per 10 000 persons) in 1972, the value is 1.17 
'. and in 1992, it is 2.4. In this twenty years, the density of bank 
offices doubles itself; If we include the quasi banks (included 
restricted licensed banks and deposit taking companies), the .density 
should be even higher. 
Another indicator of banking expansion is the deposit growth. It 
is spectacular indeed (Chart 1.1). The high growth rate of the industry 
can be explairi~g by the activism of bankers. The rapid expansion of the 
Hong Kong economy also contributes to ,its growth. 
14 
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Chart 1.1 Total deposit growth, 1966 to 1991 
In terms -of bank density, the banking system is well-established. 
i 
Yet a marked feature of the banking system in Hong Kong is that there is 
no specialized institution to cater for the various specific needs. 
Banks in Hong Kong usually carry out all banking functions. Unlike other 
countries (for instance, Britain), Hong Kong does not have industrial 
banks, agriculture banks, building societies, mortgage banks, savings 
and loans associations. An advantage of the-British arrangement is that 
the long term liability are matched against long term assets. In · Hong 
Kong, however, from retail to corporate financing, from collecting 
saving to fin~~cing the construction of new airport, all happened under 
the roof of commercial banks. Although we may find some banks more 
concentra.ting on one or' other particular sectors, overall speaking, 
specialized institutions have 'not yet been developed. As a writer 
commented, 
••• the banking industry and the wider financial system have not 
yet fully adjusted to the challenges posed by rapid economic 
· 15 
growth. While Hong Kong has transformed itse~f from an entrepot to 
an industrial economy, during the past two decades [till 1974], 
the structure of its banking and fInancial system , had remained 
basically the same as they were in the early fifties with very 
few, if any innovations in financial organizations and market. 
(Jao 1974:258-9) . 
The above writer also concluded that it was a hot bed of banking 
crisis as disturbance in one sector (in his case, the property market) 
would put the whole banking system in water. 
B. Regulatory Framework 
The bankl~g sector perhaps is the least 'regulated' economic 
sector in Hong Kong. For manufacturing industry, no matter how critics 
fire on the hands-off policy, there are still various government founded 
supporting agencies like Trade Development Council, Technical Institute, 
the Productivity Council, etc. (Sit 1978). For banking industry, 
government control is muqh more lenient. Moreover, to compare with other 
countries, the government's policy is particularly 'hands-off'. For 
instances, there is no Central Bank, and bank notes are issued by . 
private bankers. Overall speaking, the government's control amounts to 
prudence supervision only, rather than directing the development of the 
industry. Except the Moneylender Ordinance, there was no regulation on 
banking until 1,948 when a rudimentary Banking Ordinance passed. In 1960 
to 1964, owing to the outbreak of a series 'of banking crisis, the 
" 
government de-vised tighter control on Hong Kong banks. 'Tightness' here 
is actually relative. It involves requirements for the banks to have a 
minimum ~apital o,f five million, restricting advances to directors and 
relatives on a clean base, a~iriimum 25% of liquidity, submission of · 
'. full financial reports for the scrutiny of the Financial Secretary ~nd . 
the appointment of the Commission'er of Banking. The Report and the 
Ordinance passed in 1964 is only a loose guideline to banking sector to 
· 16 
protect the interest 6£ shareholders and the general public. It did not 
aim at actively instructing banking sectors how to make use of the fund 
(The Tomkins Report 1963, Banking Ordinance 1964). 
At present, the regulation on banks and deposit taking companies 
in Hong Kong is based principally on the Banking Ordinance 1986. 
However, as in the past, regulations are mainly devised to prevent 
malfeasance rather than to facilitate the government to use banking as a 
means to intervene in economy. The restrictions on lending are to 
restrict the banks taking too much risk and to avoid the directors using 
the deposit for their own purposes. Just mention some of the 
restrictions can tell it all. For instance, a bank cannot lend or 
provide facilities against the security of its own shares. It is not 
allowed to lend more than 25% of the institution's, paid up share capital 
and ' reserve to a person, .a firm, a company ... ( and so on), or to lend 
more than $250 000 to dire'ctors and their relatives, the employees who 
have the authority to approve loan~ and any of the employees' relatives, 
the controller or the controller's relative. Nor could it hold more than · 
25% of the paid up share capital and reserve of the bank in land holding 
or interest in land, except for the running of the bank e.g. bank 
premises and staff a~6ommodations. The· restrictions are far from -being 
directives of lending. 
For the role of Commissioner of Banking, he 'is charged with the 
general duty of- promoting sound business practices through improved 
prudential supervision of the banking 'sector' (Ghose 1986:101). He does 
not have the duties and rights , to formulate and enact the government 
,economic policy (if. any, of course). Even so, cri tics frequently charge ' 
that the so-calied supervision is not enough. 'Much of this was shee~ 
pretence, that prudential supervision was skin deep. At one level, it 
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was mechanistic adherence ,to a few basic numbers , and. ratios. The deep 
level was not a mystery, it was a myth' (Hong Kong Economic Paper 1985). 
The 25% of liquidity seems to be a ' guarantee to depositors, but have 
'meaning only on paper. Critics even argued that the leakage in liquidity 
requirement caused the over supply of currency as well as inflation 
(HKEJM 1981). 
There are also other regulations. In 1965, a moratorium on the 
issue of new banking license was imposed. Before the moratorium was 
, lifted in 1978, -.yirtually no new bank license had been granted (one to 
, Barclays only)l, In 1981, the Deposit- Taking Companies (Amendment) 
Ordinance 1981 was enacted to regulate the unfettered deposit - taking 
companies. Since then, the 'Three - Tier System' was established. 
The government's 'hands-qff' policy is explicit in the 
' determination of bank ' rate. Before 1965; there was no restriction or 
agreement of any form to determine the deposit rate. To strive for large 
deposit base, an interest rate war was sparked off in 1965 and a bank 
~ crisis resulted. After that crisis, the deposit rate was determined by 
the Exchange Banks' Associatipn (EBA established in 1897 as a trade 
association of the bankers). The 'EBA was, in essence, a voluntary trade 
asso6iatiori withbnly persuasive power over its members. When the 1980 
Association of Bank Ordinance was passed, the EBA was replaced by ,the 
Association of Bank. It is a statutory body and its rules and 
regulations ar&binding on its members. All licensed banks should be a 
member of the Association. The 'deposit : rate, ' therefore, is determined by 
the banking industry itself.~~terally speaking, the government does not 
IThe moratorium was r~imposed in August 1979. In that period, new banks were 
granted with licenses. Since May 1981, the moratorium had again been lifted to a 
limited extent. 
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have any says on i t 2', 
For lending rate, there is even no such collective mechanism for 
regulation. The banks are left free to charge their clients with 
disc-retionary rate. The only condi tion is that they are not allowed to 
charge more than 60% per ' annum3. The well known 'Prime Rate' (P) is the 
uniform offering of the note issuing banks to their best clients. It is 
not an agreement of any form on lending rate, after all, other banks 
will use it for reference and it is commonly conceived as the price of 
money in Hong-" Kong. In effect, not all banks will lend out at P, 
especially those with only . slim local deposit base. They have to obtain 
fund from the inter bank market. They have to charge a higher rate than 
the large local banks - P plus a margin - to earn the same amount. 
The other commonly used lending rate is HIBOR - Hong Kong Inter 
Bank Offered Rate. It is used only by the largest banks ~nd only fbr 
large deals. HIBOR is the lending rate between banks i.e. the price of 
money between banks. The large qanks have wide local deposit bases. The 
cost of money for them is relatively lower so they can still make money 
on HIBOR. Also, it ii economical only for large deals (for the above 
description, see Chill and Chot 1992, Ghose 1986, Jao 1973, KPMG 1989). 
If there is any control over the banking sector, the Hong Kong 
government is at best exercising only 'arm's length' control over it. We 
can see that the gover~nment does not control the bank rate, issue note 
and impose directives on the banking sector. Moreover, even in the areas. 
2In the deposit rate arrangement, not all banks are subjected to the same rate. 
For the large insti tutions ~ they ~ve the brand. name and already seized a considerable 
market share so that smaller banks will be in a ' disadvantageous position. To deal with 
this asymaetry,the banks are divided .into four categories. The smaller banks can add ' 
a certain margin to the agreed rate so that they are more competitive with respect to 
deposit rate. Nevertheless, the deposit rate is determined by the banking industry 
itself. Literaliy speaking, the government do not have any says on it. . 
3It is under the , Moneylender Ordinance Section 24 (1) 1911. Later it is 
replaced by a new Ordinance in 1980. 
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that the government has supervised, it does not seem that the slack 
supervision will have much negative effect ·in lending. Whether it 
actually possess the capacity to do so is another problem. But if it 
insists on regaining control, it is very likely that a large disturbance 
,will happen in the sector and much resentment will result. In view of 
the peculiar self-regulatory nature of Hong Kong's banking system, it is 
thus concluded that to ' study in the relation between banking and 
industry, the government's role is indeed minimal. When we talk about 
this relation,- we have to obtain an explanation from either the 
commercial banks or the manufacturing industry. 
11. MANUFACTURERS' GRIEVANCES ••• 
How well do bankers serve local manufacturers? There are 
___ essentially two major claims on this issue. The first claim is that Hong 
Kong industrialists obtained much financial help from banks and the 
industrialization of Hong Kong was in fact spurred by high bank 
. involvement. The other claim, on the contrary, protested that Hong Kong 
manufacturing industry-was dying for insufficient financial aids and the 
banks were engaged in ~very profit making sectors except the 
manufacturing industry. One should note that ~ the debate is not 
restricted to the early period of industrialization, i.e. the fifties 
and sixties. As the inve8tigator observed, debate on this issue came out 
occasionally in these three decades. In '-effect, insufficiency of funds 
implies that a public industrial financial institution is needed. 
However '" for~ such' an institution to be fruitful, the government should 
establish something like an, economic planning agency in the 
administration ,to work out a general idea about which sub-sector in' the 
manufacturing should have priorities of assistance. Fo~ such 
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formulations, a compr~~ensive development plan is the prerequisite. 
However, it will greatly violate the hands-off policy of Hong Kong 
government (Matthews 1960:435). Although industrialists who asked for a 
,public industrial bank might not envisage any developmental planning, 
the latter is certainly implied. It my view, .the debate on industrial 
banks, together with the debate on central banking and comprehensive 
development planning, reflects a major question that the· post war Hong 
Kong society faced: Should the government be permissive in economic 
affairs? Or should it seek a higher profile? Whenever there were any 
serious disturbances in the economy, these issues would be raised out. 
A. The Claims of Sufficient Bank Finance 
.. 
One end of the spectrum of views on industry - finance 
relationship asserts ' that Hong Kon-g bankers have done their best to 
serve industry. Although very few schol~rly works have directly studied 
on this issue, existing sources (dominated by Jao's argument) tend to 
adopt this position. Moreover, as can be easily understood, bankers are 
a major proponent of this stance too. 
A leading banker suggested that 'the leading banks have been 
called upon to financ~ not only the working capital, but also fixed 
capital on a medium or long-term bases. They have often agreed to do, 
more for the sake of Col~~y's ec~nomy as a whole than for their own 
gain' (Carruthers 1966: 368). Moreover, 'the interest rate charged . by , the 
leading commercial banks on loaris to industry has always been ,maintained 
at a very reasonable level when compared with even the highly developed 
countries of the Western world ·where capital is abundant. 'This cheap 
finance' is undouptedly one of the 'most important factors responsible ' for 
the- outstanding growth of the Colony's industry in general and textiles 
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in particular' (1966:369). Bankers repeatedly stre~sed that 'bank 
finance involved in furnishing fixed assets frequently exceeded the 
value of proprietors' funds' (Graham 1969:150). This, however, seems to 
, contradict the research , findings of the latter section (see below). The 
commercial banking principle 'borrow short, -lend short' was also not an 
obstacle to 'lending long'. Jao also echoed that 'it is inconceivable 
that the [textile] industry as a whole could survive to many crises 
during the past two decades [1950 to 1970] without adequate banking 
supports' and ·'·the bank on its part values much the business offered by 
the industrialists as a dependent source of earning' (Jao 1970:24-25). 
Jao's study finds that the role of the. Hongkong and Shanghai 
Banking Corporation was unreplaceable among the banks in Hong Kong. 
Jao's study focused only on HSBC and in the period of early 
industrialization, It was found that the lending policy of HSB8 was 
'hard-headed; prudent and ' shrewd toward· Hong Kong's manufacturing 
iridustries.' However, 'a general desire to assist local industrial 
. development could be found ••• While this policy stance is hardly 
surprising for a profit-motivated priv'ate commercial bank, it is also 
different fiom the idyllic picture in the. official cemetery volume' (Jao 
1983:553). It was said that from the 'beginning the Bank's Mongkok 
office, established ·to help the multitude of industrial establishments 
in Kowloon, was highly involved in industrial financing (Jao 1983:544). 
Dur ing the pe'r~9d from June 1966 to March 1970, loans and advances to 
the manufacturing sector accounted for , about thirty percent of the 
bank's loan portfolio and remained the largest sector in terms of credit 
allocated. 
In a government report, it was said that lack of finance had not 
been a constraint for potentially viable projects requiring long-term 
22 ' 
finance. Even small firms with viable projects could, obtain the finance 
they needed without special assistance (Report of the Advisory Committee 
on Diversification 1979:196). It was also reported that the industrial 
leaders found that the commercial -banks had served the manufacturing 
sector well regarding the provision of loans (1979:132). 
On the manufacturers' side, a study showed that banks' backing was 
crucial for the infant industry and rarely did the industrialists failed 
to seek bank supports. 
From the v~ry beginning, Hong Kong's industries have been 
under-capitalized ... Industrialists 'made do' with minimum 
investments and borrowed as much as they could from the . 
banks. They took out their profits for ,· deposit or investment 
outside of Hong Kong. They did no hesitate to grow in order 
to meet their markets' demands, but they financed as much as 
much of their growth possible through bank credit. (Espy 
1970:137) 
Moreover, the writer also affirmed that banks provided both short and 
medium term credit and long term loaris. 
The general picture here shows that in the early period of 
industrialization, the affirmative - role of banks ' in Hong Kong was 
undeniable, although the actual contribution is not known. Especially in 
the textile -establishments, banks made their crucial contributions. 
B. The Claims of Insufficient Bank Financing 
. The first person who wrote about the industrial financing was 
Szczepanik,an_ early observer of the Hong Kong economy. He observed that 
after the Second World War and Korean War, entrepot trading dropped 
dramatically and the Hong Kong economy was at stake. Industrialization 
could be a rescue. However, the situation was unfavorable. 
The supply of cash in Hong Kong during the period of post 
war industrial expansion was fairly rigid. The Colony's. 
licensed banks preserved th~ir traditional "commercial'·' 
character without venturing to enter the field of industrial. 
financing to any significant extent ••• 
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The process of industrialization was thus financed 
mainly from amplified private capital sources and through 
traditional commercial credit channels; whereas 
institutional financing, facilitated by the Stock Exchange, 
enabled the flow of capital to expand the infra-structure of 
the economy, i.e. the port and public utilities so essential 
to its growth. (Szczepanik 1956:783) 
Szczepanik's observation laid down a major ,argument of the debate: 
the character of commercial bank does not facilitate industry. Hong Kong 
has few non bank sources of financing and the capital market opt for 
speculative acti vi ties only. Wi th r 'espect to bank financing, it is not 
favorable to i~dustrialists. Other comments proposed that the commercial 
bankers (especially the leading British banks) were so keen. on competing 
with each other and the weapon for fighting - high deposit rate - would 
lead to high lending rate. It surely had negative effects on 
industrialists. Moreover, echoed with Szczepanik, another writer claimed 
that 'As ' the commercial banks they are only interested in making working-
i 
capital loans, leaving the fixed capital loans to the money lenders, who 
charge very high rate of interest. Only -a small number of banks take an 
active part in financing of industries' (Chen 1961:96)~ To found an 
industrial bank was necessary because 'as a general principle, only well 
established firms stand to benefit from this [the commercial banks 
provided finance] ,and as most of the factories ' in Hong Kong were small 
and not, by the standards of such banks, to be described as 'well-
established', their chances of 'obtaining credit facilities are slim' 
(Chen 1965:410, see also Sutu 1965). 
At the end of fifties, ;the leading industrialists made ' appeal to 
set up an official head industrial financing institution. An Industrial 
Bank Committee was set up to see the demand and feasibility. The appeal 
was turned down~ It is because the committee observed that 
There are indications that there was a significant further 
development on lending policy to industry during 1959, and 
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we are confident that industrial loans rose c~nsiderably 
during the year both absolutely and in relation to other 
loans. (Industrial Bank Committee 1960:9) 
However, appeals had not stopped. Grievances and appeals were 
" still pervading. Even in the eighties, it was not infrequent to hear the 
claims of reporters and industrialists (see -HKIN 1985, HKJEM 1985). A 
leading banker even admitted that the situation of industrial financing 
was unsatisfactory (Brown 1981). It is unfortunate that few ' scholarly 
works have directly tackled this, problem. Probably financing is quite a 
-
sensitive issu~_ " for businessmen, especially for the Chinese 
entrepreneurs. It makes research on this area very difficult. Even so, 
researches on manufacturing industry still ~rovide some indirect 
information. Most of these researches revealed that Hong Kong 
entrepreneurs are highly relied on their own resources to set up new 
factories. Theearllest researchon ,it should be the government's survey 
I 
on the , financing of Hong Kong industry.-
To mitigate protest of industrialists, the Department of Commerce 
and Industry set about a survey and presented a report to the Trade and 
Industry Advisory Board. It was found that only 11% of the capital to 
start a factory was borrowed by the owner from various sources. For the 
initial capital, little came from banks. Apart from -the money in 
entrepreneurs' purse, relatives and friends were the major sources of 
initial capital. Overall , speaking, the banks did poorly in initial 
capital and qapital formation. They did -better in providing working 
" 
capital (Goodstadt 1969:224-226). The , findings are puzzling for it 
concluded ' that local manufacturers could obtain money from various 
sources and thus di ff icul ties' faced by firms in raising capi tal should 
not be exaggerated. However, as the editor noted, two key questions had 
yet to be answered: how many firms failed to establish themselves 
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because of a shortage of fund, and how many potentially viable firms 
failed because of financial difficulties. After all, these two questions 
are unlikely to be meaningfully answered for one cannot survey the not 
yet established and the already closed down firms. 
Awarding to Sit and Wong's researches on small and medium size 
factories, factories get little money from the financial system (Table 
1.1). Most of these factories (71.4%) relied on industrialists' own 
savings as the starting capital. The other source was 'industrialist's 
own capi tal plus-"others'. In these cases, industrialists usually had 
more than half of the shares. Few establishments got money from bank and 
financial companies (Sit and Wong 1989:149). Up to 10% of them found 
that capital is the major problem encountered when starting business 
(1989:200). Sit and Wong's study revealed that banks and other financial 
institutions are far from a help for starting up a firm. However, during 
operation, finance was not a major problBm. 
Table 1.1 
Initial Capital of Industrialists 
Own funds (1) 
Borrow from relatives 
Borrow from friends 
Loans. bank. finan. co. 
Combination with 1 
% of responding firm 






Source: Sit and Wong. 1989: 149, Table 11.7 
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Yip's study on Hong Kong small industry is to the point. The 
sample cases he used were those ' already hav~ng facilities in the HSBC. 
In asking the questions 'problems faced by SIE [Small Industrial 
Establishment], 53% of the total found capital to be the largest 
difficulty faced in the initial period. Laborand market were ranked 
second and third respectively (Table 2.2). During operation, 55.3% found 
labor to be the single most important problem while 16.33% of them 
regard capital as the bottleneck. However, we should bear in mind that 
the respondents were those who already had bank facilities. They were 
supposed to be served. Even so, they still found financing a problem for 
both starting up and expansion. In a break down (Table 2.3), the 
electrical/electronic industry mostly regarded capital as the major 
difficulties in starting and in expansion (33.36%, equal to labor). Few 
of ~hem found it a di~ficulty during operation. 32.25% of cases in -
clothing industry ranked capital the first (32.25%) for starting and 
34.78% for expansion (65.22% for labor). During operation, clothing 
industrialists found capital a greater difficulty (31.25%) than 
electrical/electronic industry. 
The above researches seems confirming the early comments that 
banks are more likely to provide working capital than the long term 
loans. -Moreover, <;>verall speaking, loans for capital formation for -both 
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Table 1.4 
Major Difficulties in Electrical I Electron,ic Industry 
Difficulties . Start Up Operation 
Capital 94.12 5.88 




Total (No.) 34 34 
























What can we learn from the above literature? ,Firstly, it is 
reasonable to deduce that there is a general dissatisfaction among 
industrialists and journalists that banks provide insufficient 
t' financing. That is why the debate goes on and on in these four decades • 
. Some critics find the small establishments are un~erprivileged for in 
the banker's eye, they are not well-established. We cannot ignore the 
surveys showing that even small firms can also obtain bank credits, 
though we do not know how many firms have closed down or could not be 
~ 
established because of no money. On the bankers side, some leading 
' · 1' 
bankers did find themselves doing their best. We are also informed that 
the HSBC took quite an important role in financing for industry. Espy 
study also tells us that the firms he investigated {all are large 
establishments} faced few difficulties in obtaining bank financing. In 
general, we believe that for the large firm, borrowing is more easy. 
Ill. THE QUANTITATIVE SIDE: TRENDS OF LOANS DISTRIBUTION 
What is the fact? Do the banks provide insufficient financial 
help? Here, the published statistical data will be used to see how much 
the banks did. We should note that strictly speaking, the available 
statistical data can only tell us the amount and the relative weight of 
industrial loans. It is not necessarily bean indicator of sufficiency. 
It is because 'sufficiency' is', a question of 1) how much the bankers 
have offered-2) how industrialists responded to· the resources obtained. 
Low level of involvement can still be regarded as enough. The issue here 
is that 'sufficiency' is not only a function of bank involvement, but 
also the ·operation of factories. Here, only the banks' involvement in 
industry will 'he illustrated. We will be going to see whether- the loans 
to manufacturing industry, with respect to its importance in Hong Kong, 
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are under represented. Beware that we can only get a plain description 
of the amount of resources injected from banks. 
We may first look at the distribution trends of loans among major 
sectorJ (Chart 1.1, 1.2, Table 1.5, 1.6). In 1965, the general commerce 
ranked highest among the major groupings. However, one should bear in 
mind that within general commerce, the proportion of loans flows to 
import and export trading is unknown. general commerce occupied such a 
lion share is conceivable. First of . all, trading is closely linked with 
bank financing~ In the interim of ordering, shipping and payment, 
various problems arise like when should the bill be paid, before or 
after shipping, before or after receipt of goods? It is the documentary 
of credit system that puts banks as the middlemen between foreign buyers 
and local suppliers (or the reverse). It is even impossible to do long 
distance trading without bank' "s mediation. 
Before Second World War, Hong Kong was already an regional 
entrepot in the Far East. That is why before the Second World War, a 
good trade financing framework, headed by major British banking houses, 
had already been established in Hong Kong. 
The item general commerce took a share of 32% in 1965 and 36 % in 
1970. For every hundred dollars the banks lent out for "local use, there 
were thirty six for trading. It dropped from~ 1971 to 1974 and reached 
new height in 37.2%. Then, it eX,hibi ts a continuous downward slopping. 
Unfortunately that after 1982, trade financing has been excluded 
4HOW the loans be classified? As we know, loans for use for industrial 
purposes may carry some characteristics of trade financing e.g. use of the Letter of 
Credit and various usage of the documentary of credit system. Par this problem, the 
investigator consulted the personnel in the Monetary Branch. He said that loans are 
classified by end usage. The form that is used for collecting loans information from 
banks (Porm BC2A Rev. 91) also guides that 'a loan should be classified according to 
the borrower or the ultimate beneficiary which may serve as a reference in deciding the · 
classification'. Hence, a loan appears in the form of trade financing will still be 
classif ied as industrial loan • Although as a whole the imQOrt erport trading is closely 
associated with manufacturing industry in Hong Kong, we cannot treat the amount 
classified as lIE trading as for industrial purposes. 
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, ~nsoort and transport eauipment 
[Er.ctricicv. gas and telephone 
~Idinq, construction and propertY development " 
[WhOlesale. retail and import export crade 
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Table 1.7 
Percentage Distribution of Loans and Advances in Hong Kong, 
By Major Sectors (including Trade Financing), 1982 to 1990 
i 1982 Oec i 1983 Oec 11984 Dec \1985 Oec 1,986 Doe i 1987 Ooc 11988 Doe 11989 Oeo \ 1 990 000 
I S.98%i 8 .58%1 8.21%1 8.15%1 8.98%1 8.00%\ 7.86%\ 7.28% 6.63% 
I 6.54%1 7.31%\ 6.78~~1 6.27%1 4.78o~1 4.04%1 3.50%\ 4.88% 4.56% 
r 1.39% I 1.42% I 2.00% I 2.00% I 1.65% I 1.10% 1 0.85 % I 0.81 % 1.02% 
I 22.52%1 '9.68%! 19.07%1 15.34%1 11.96% 1 10.59%\ '1.92%1 , 5.67% 15.01 % 
I 25.72%i 26 .59%i 27 .19%1 25.67%\ 25.15%1 24.08%1 24.38%1 20.48%1 20.25% 
I 0.13%1 0.09%1 0.13~~i 0.07%1 0.05%1 0.07%1 0.08%1 0.11%1 0.17% 
\ 34.65%1 36.25%1 36.52% 1 42.41%1 47 .36%1 52.08%1 51.34%1 50.70%1 52.30°,(, 




from the record on loans and advances for use in Hong Kong and a new 
categorization was adopted5• By we simply adding the value of 'financing 
import to export fro~ Hong Kong trade in another table~ we find that the 
whole sector, i.e. General commerce amounted to 26% from 1982 to 1985 
and was dropped to 20% in 1990 (Table 1.7). 
The second important grouping is 'miscellaneous,6. In 1965, it 
took 26.3% and the share kept on rising and reached its peak in 1972. 
From 1972 to 1977, Miscellaneous moved to a position even higher than 
General commerce. It fluctuated some where near 40% and dropped for four 
years. It rocketed in the eighties and reached a height of fifty eight 
percent in 1990. It means that more than half of bank loans used in 'Hong ' 
Kong is channelled to Miscellaneous. 
Among the miscellaneous, in 1965, a sub category 'financial 
concerns include banks' ranked the third. The one ranked second is 'for 
business purposes'. This heading is ambiguous enough so we cannot see 
what it refers to. The first rank is 'for private purposes'. It took 27% 
of Miscellaneous in 19651• 
The sub-category 'for private purposes' is curious. It rise up to 
forty percent in the seventies (38.6% in 1971, 38.1% in 1977). A further 
break down after 1982 reveals that the item 'to purchase other 
residential property' took the first important component among all the 
Miscellaneous. In 1989, it took .27.8% of Miscellaneous. If we added in 
5In th~ new series, a new category 'wholesale and retail trade' replaced the 
old one 'General commerce' with sub categories 'import, export and wholesale trade' and 
'Retail trade' • It is a better categorization in fact for the import and export trading 
is quit different (in Hong Kong) from wholesale trade and should not be taken as one. 
However, this new categorization cause difficulties in comparison. 
6Miscellaneous is not a 'sector', but, we should abide to the official 
categorization. 
7Another item 'All others' have a figure 26.2%. But it make no sense to discuss 
on it because we do not know what are included. 
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the item 'to purchase ilats in the Home Ownership Scheme and Private 
Sector Participation Scheme', loans for buying flats took 30% of 
Miscellaneous and about 17.5% of all loans that are used. 
The trend for building and construction sector is simple. In 1965, 
it was ranked as the fourth and accounted for about only eight percent. 
It dropped substantially from the late sixties till 1980. Perhaps after 
the banking crisis which stemmed from real estate speculation in mid and 
late sixties, the bankers became more cautious. Moreover, the 'building 
cycle' in property market described by Jao may have effects on the loans 
trend (1974:251-255). Nevertheless, from 1980 onward, it rose 
dramatically and within. two years it shot up to 26.4% in 1982, 
representing the property bloom in the early eighties. Even so, rarely 
did it drop down to a point below the share of manufacturing industry 
after 1982 and never has-it dropped to ten percent. 
Transport is another simple trend. In the first five years of the 
seventies, it rose to fifteen percent and then dropped continuously. 
Among the major sectors, the trend of loans and advances to 
manufacturing contradicts our common perception. In 1965, up to twenty 
percent of locally used loans were channelled to the manufacturing 
industry. I t kept at around 19% 0 f the total till 1970. A steep dec r'ease 
occurred in the four years after 1970 and the percentage was reduced to 
only nine percent in 1975. Within the ten years afte~ 1965, the share of 
loans to manufacturers decreased by hundred percent and rarely did it 
. . . 
rise above fourteen (14% in 1978, 13.7% in 1979). In the eighties, it 
fluctuated at around ten percent and was down to seven percent in 1990. 
We should note that the figures shown from 1982. to 1990 are in fact 
inflated in com~arison with the old categorization for a crucial share 
of loans - loans for trade financing - is excluded from the table after 
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1982. If we abide to the old series (to include trade financing into the 
table), the figures will be deflated as the grand total is enlarged. It 
took only 9% in 1982, 9% in 1986 and 6.6% in 1990 respectively. 
Before 1965, 'General commerce' was ranked as the most important 
loans receiver whilemanufa~turing industry and building and property 
development jockeyed for the second. After 1970, it dropped 
substantially and in 1974, it was ranked below transport and commerce. 
In 1982, even building, wholesale and retailing, and trade financing 
over took industry. From 1986 onward, even loans to purchase residential 
property were ranked higher than industry. 
Before 1970, loans and advances to manufacturing industry, among 
General commerce and miscellaneous, formed a major part of banks loans 
in Hong Kong. After 1973, its importance fell continuously, though it's 
role still mattered. It was far behind General commerce, less than 
wholesale and retail, jockeying with building and property development 
(but lost most of the time) ~nd has been overtaken by 'loans to purchase 
other residential flats' in recent years. What does it all tell us? A 
conclusion can be drawn tentatively here: in Hong Kong, loans to the 
manufacturing sector do not make up a crucial part of the lending 
market. That is, the Hong Kong banking sector lends little to 
manufacturing industry. 
To view from the amount o~ loans and credit it obtains, the 
manufacturing~sector does not seem to be the utmost important sector in 
Hong Kong. At least .from the bankers' eyes, the manufacturing industry 
is not their largest client. However, in relation to other indicators, 
we can see that manufacturing .industry is the most important sector in 
the Hong Kong e~onomy. We may first look at the number of people engaged 
in this sector. 
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· We may see the weight of manufacturing industry from three 
indicators: number of establishments, number of persons engaged in, and 
the share of GDP it takes. We do not have the government's estimation of 
the years before 1973 on numbers of establishments and persons engaged 
in wholesale, retail andi~port / export trades, restaurants and hotels. 
Glance on the statistics will find that before 1973, 78% of Hong Kong 
workers were engaged in manufacturing and 76% of all private 
establishment were industrialS {Table 2.8}. It is because the 
'wholesale' category formed the lion share of the grand total and 
exclusion of it would greatly inflate the figures of the remaining 
categories. However, in 1976, when all statistics were available, the 
manufadttiring sector still constituted fifty four per cent of the total 
Hong Kong work force. That is to say, more than half of working people 
were factory workers. The rate declined in a very steady fashion. In 
1986, it was 40%. In 1990, it was 31%. Industrial establishments took 
32% of the total Hong Kong business establishment in 1976 and about 
twenty percent in 1990. Even we do not have any accurate estimation for 
the time before 1976, it is not unreasonable to infer that the rate 
might be higher. 
8The categorization of Table 3.8 and the latter tables on GDP is different 
from that of . the loans distribution. Nevertheless, to obtain a general idea of the 
weight of the manufacturing sector, it is . acceptable. 
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Table 1.8 
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In view of GDP, the same hold trut~ (Table ~.9, 1.10). In 1970, 
manufacturing contributed 31% of the whole Gross Domestic Product. From 
1970 to 1976, it never dropped below 25.5%. If we say that the 
importance of manufacture has been declining in recent years, it is not 
accurate. It is because in the whole eighties (1982 onward), shares of" 
GDP constituted by manufacturing sector kept at about twenty percent and 
only after 1989 did it dropped below this level. Moreover, from 1970 to 
1976, manufacture took up the largest share of GDP. 'Wholesale' ranked 
second and in 1976, it is four percentage less than the former. From 
1982 to 1986, it jockeyed with manufacture. Afterwards, it was a crispy 
overtaken by wholesale. The third and second ranks after 1989 were 
manufacturing and finance respectively. In terms of GDP, manufacture was 
the most important sector in most of the time before 1986. Although we 
do not kno~ how much the difference in categorization (~~e note 6) 
affect the figures, to say that the manufacturing sector not important 
is not true even in terms of GDP only. 
Table 1.9 
Percentage Distribution of GDP. " " 
By Industrial O~gin (at Current Market Price). 1970 to 1980 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 : 1975 1977 1978 1979 1980 
AgriC\lltula and fi.hing 2. 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.1 1 
Minino and quanvino 0.2 O.t 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
30.9 28.1 26.9 25.S 25.8 26.9 28.2 26.9 26.5 25.6 25.1 Manutacturino 
ElectricitY, gll. and water 2 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.2 
1.3 
Conltt\Jction 4.2 4.9 5.3 S.5 6.1 5.7 S.4 5.9 6.9 
6.7 7.1 
Wholesale, and retailt trede., 19.6 19.5 20.1 2.1.5 20.8 20.7 21 21.4 2.1.1 20.9 19.2 
and restwrants. and hotels 
Transoort. Itorao_ 7.5 5.8 6.2 "6.4 6.9 7.2. 7.3 6.9 7.2. 7.1 7.2. 
2nd communicatinon 
Financino. inwrance. I •• 14.9 17.5 20.5 19.2 17.5 17 17.8 19.5 2.0.4 ~2.6 25.9 
estate and business .aMce. 
CommunitY, .ocial end personal la 18.9 17.1 17.2. 19 18.1 18.9 15.4 14.9 13.5 12...9 
IIMc •• 
Acti...ttl .. not adoQUately defined 0.6 0.6 0.5 . 0.4 " 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3 0 .3 0.3 0.3 
Source : Monlhly Digest of Statistics, Various issues 
9The categorization of the items is different for th& two decades. However, it 
causes many problems in the study for we aim at obtaining a general picture only. 
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Table '1.10 
Percentage Distribution of GDP, 
By Economic Activity (at Current Market :rice), 1981 to 1989 
;982 1984 1985 1985 1981 
1988 1989 
1980 1981 1983 
0.5 O.S O.S· 0.4 0.3 0.3 AOricultur. and tishino 0.8 0.7 - 0.7 0.6 
0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Mining and quarrying 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
21.9 22..3 21.1 2.0.1 18.9 
Manuf.cturing 23.8 22..8 2.0.7 2.2.8 24.1 
2.7 l 2..8 2.5 2.3 
ElectriciCV. 0" and water 1.3 1.4 1.8 2.4 2.5 
6.3 5.3 5 4.8 4.7 4.8 5.3 ConstNction 6.7 7.5 7.3 
19.5 22.2 21.8 21.3 23.2 23.8 24 Wholesale . and liE trades. 20.4 195 19.1 
and rllStaurants. and hotels 
8.1 8.7 9.2 8.9 7.7 8.2 7.8 8.1 Transport. ,torsoe 7.S 7.5 
and communicatinon 
17.3 18.2 19.2 19.8 
Financing. insurance. real 22.S 23.8 22.6 17.9 15.9 
16.3 
IIStet. and business ,,,rviCIIS 
17.3 16.6 15 14.6 14.6 
Community. ,ocial and personal 12.5 13.3 15.6 16.4 15.9 
services 
11 10.7 10.3 10.5 10.9 
Ownership ot pramsllS 9.6 9.8 10.8 11.8 
10.8 
4.8 4.7 5.1 5.1 5 
lass imouted banl( sarvice 5.6 5.5 6.5 6.1 5.1 
Source: Monthly Digest of Slatislics, Various Issues 
What do all these figures tell us? The above data confirm that 
manufacturing industry is one of the most important sector of Hong Kong 
economy, no matter how much share of GDP it contributes or how many 
number of establishments and persons have engaged in. However, 
regarding the distribution of loans and advances from banking system, we 
find that it is under represented. Bank loans are channelled to building 
and construction, wholesale and retail and trading, and to purchase 
private residential property rather than to manufacture. One should not 
. consider it as the sole case of' the present .. industrial decline. In 
reality, after 1973, loans to manufacturing sectors dropped 
substantially in spite of the rapid industrial growth in the seventies. 
Here, ~~ are led to conclude that on the whole, bank loans to 
industry is under represented. Considering the share of GDP 
manufacturing industry constituted, number of workers engaged and even 
number of establishments, only a very low proportion of bank loans used 
in Hong Kong that had been channelled to the sector~ 
Common sense tell us that if there is a demand, supply will 
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follow. Why banks do not explore the market if it is , profitable? Why do 
they apparently overlook a dynamic growing sector as manufacturing? How 
can we account for the obstacles that prohibit bankers from lending to 
industrialists? How can we account for the obstacles· that refrain 
industrialists from lending? 
In the following parts of this paper, a theory of trust will be 





TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF TRUST 
A grave problem confronting sociologists of economic life in Hong 
Kong is that Hong Kong is a laissez faire economy. If the invisible 
hands of market ."are the regulator of economic life in Hong Kong, why do 
we need sociological accounts? Why do we not stick to economics in 
making sense of the Hong Kong economy? 
As I mentioned before, the concept of 'trust' is a point of entry 
for the sociological study of market behavior. In this chapter, the 
concept of trust as espoused by various theorists, Luhmann, Granovetter 
and Zucker will be discussed. Through criticizing and appraising their 
work, an agenda for the use of this concept will be developed1. 
If we find trust such an important concept, the first question 
that follows is, what , is trust? Many writers had some words on this 
concept but rarely did they defined it explicitly. Only Luhmann (1979) 
and Barber (1983) have treated trust as their focus of s~udy in recent 
years2. Luhmann's work is very well formulated. I will base on it as an 
IThere _ are four approaches to the study of trust. First, it is an 
ethnomethodol'ogical approach. This approach forms the mains of the relevant 
literatures. 'Trust' for these theorists are conceived as social construct (Granfinkel 
1963, Henslin 1968). A second approach run a psychological line. Heavily reliant on 
experimental study, theorists treated 'trust' as cooperation within experimental group 
(see especially Deutsch 1958). A third line relates trust with social exchange (Blau 
1968, Coleman 1988, Granovetter 1985). Although they have different emphasis, the above 
three approaches confine the analysis of trust in an interpersonal and interactional 
level. A new branch is associated with Zucker (1986) and Shapiro's works (1987, 1992). 
This line suggests that trust can be institutionally generated. 
2Early writers like Weber, Simmel and Parsons did have some remarks on this 
issue but they are· so scatt~red and it will take a lot of efforts to piece it together 
(see Lewis and Weigart 1985b). For contemporary writers, Granovetter had some word on 
trust but he provided no systematic discussion on its nature. Shapiro disagreed with 
Granovetter's notion but did not offer any definite say on it. Zucker has defined it 
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entry point. 
His framework is highly abstract. Although it sheds much light on 
the present study, however, it is not useful in empirical study. 
Moreover, if the enquiry is going to be an empirical study, we need 
intermediate middle range iheories to link up the various levels of 
abstraction. Here, fortunately the works of Granovetter and Zucker can 
fill this gap. While one of them deals with the manifestation of trust 
at an interpersonal level, the other at an institutional level. Both 
(with modification) serve as the middle range connection between Luhmann 
and the concrete reality. This facilitate an empirical study of my 
theoretical problem. In the rest of the chapter, the notion of trust of 
Luhmann will be discussed first. In the second part, the works of 
Granovetter and Zucker will be presented. An agenda for studying trust 
will developed. 
I. LUHMANN'S NOTION OF TRUST 
In Luhmann's words, 
The world is overwhelmingly complex for every level of real 
system, whether it consists of physical or biological units, 
rocks, plants or animals. Its possibilities exceed those to 
which the system has the capacity to respond. (Luhmann 
1979:13) 
Systems '0 e. g . individual, organization, government, are fac ing the 
ever changing environment. Its possibility is infinitive. The future 
contains far -more possibilities than could be realized in the present. 
'The uncertainty which is bound to exist is simply a consequence of the 
very elementary fact that not all factors can become the present and 
hence become the past' (Luhmann 1979:13). The future is an excessive 
but his definition has few ' connection with the main body of his theory. Even Blau 
(1968), Henslin (1972) had not explicitly defined it. They were talking of how trust 
is produced (Shapiro, Zucker and some Granovetter), which kind of person trustworthy 
(Henslin), how trust facilitates exchange (Blau, Granovetter). 
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burden on human being as his capacity to represent things to himself is 
very limited. When human being acts here and now there have to have 
something certain in order to formulate a course of action. If the only 
certain things are those - that have already happened and are already 
known, human being has to live in the present along with this 
~verlasting over-complex future. fipart from the paralysing fear and 
chaos or utterly refraining from action, what can we do? We must, 
therefore, prune the future so as to ,measure up with the present 
(Luhmann 1979:13). In trusting, one engages in action as though there 
are only limited possibilities in the future (Luhmann 1979:20). To trust 
is to assure something uncertain. In reality, however, there is less 
information available than would be required to give us this assurance. 
Generally speaking, the truster seeks in his subjective image of the 
world some objective clues about whether or not trust is justified. The 
likely behavior of the person to be trusted can never be exhaustively 
traced. Therefore one should therefore be clear here that the clues used 
to form trust do not eliminate the -risk. The only way to eliminate risk 
1S not to act. Information simply serves as a springboard for the leap 
into uncertainty. Information cannot 'reduce' risk, rather it 
facilitates the 'induction' processing. In the 'last resort no decisive 
grounds can be offered for trusting. Trust, hence, in essence, is a 
risky behavior. One exposes hims~lf to uncertainty. It is a leap of 
faith. That ,is why Luhmann using dramatic expressions like 'trust rest 
on illusion' (Luhmann 1979:33), 'trust is a gamble, a risky investment' 
(1979:24). 
If we think in this way, the world will seem to be too uncertain 
to live in as. every step we take involves a 'leap of faith'. In reality, 
not every decision rises ' to such a high level of consciousness. Many , 
45 
decisions are sunk into the routinization of everyda~ life. However, the 
problem still exists: what is the basis of trust so that even there are 
not enough information, one will still take the step? According to . 
Luhmann, there are two major bases of trust: familiarity and possibility 
of sanction. 
'Trust only possible in a familiar world. One cannot confer trust 
without essential bases and without any previous experiences' (Luhmann 
1979:20). It is because the nature of· trust is a leap into uncertainty, 
one has to have , ~omething 'certain' at hand so as to make the leap 
justifiable. If people are accustomed with the operation of a system, 
they are more likely to use it as the materials for the calculations on 
future action. Familiartty is, in a sense,.abundance of information. 
Familiarity in an interactional level is more tangible. It only 
involves having knowledge of other people in a certain social circle. 
When we meet new people, we have some idea that how they would possibly 
act in the future after some interactions, reflections and calculations. 
. In a highly complex system, the building up of trusts may involves 
acquiring knowledge of unknown people and institutions. New procedures 
must be devised to bring these 'unknowns' into the manageable. That is 
why Luhmann said that trust ' is not only associated with emotional terms 
but also with a presentional term (Luhmann 1979:22). What that 
procedures aim at is to reproduce familiarity (see below) at an 
institutional _level. 
The other base of trust is the possibility of sanction. We should 
note that sanction facilitates trusts not straightly by its coercive 
nature i.e. punishment makes one comply, but it shapes the motivational 
structure of both the trusters and trustees. 
On the one hand he [the truster] will find it worthwhile to 
ask himself with what prospects for gain and loss his 
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partner can reckon, if he is trusted. Cou!d there be 
especially large rewards for him if he broke trust? On the 
other hand, significance attaches to the possibility he 
(i.e. the potentia! truster) possesses of exercising 
influence (at a cost to be taken into account) upon the fate 
of his partner. (Luhmann 1979:33) 
When a truster expects that his partner cannot bear the enormous 
cost of breaching of trust, his trust is more justifiable. The lega! 
arrangement is not 'producing trust', but leads to certain expectations 
for the two parties i.e. how other will act in the future. In this 
sense, possibility of sanction works as a base of trust like 
familiarity. However, whether the partner will in the end actually make 
his calculations with reference to law and sanctions is not decisive. It 
always leaves the possibility that one will breach trust in spite of 
heavy losses. No matter how heavy the punishment is, it is still 
possible. that one may commit crime. Like familiarity, it is not a 
conc!usive solution. 
It should be noted that possible sanctions are not confined to 
formal legal arrangement. Moral sanction carries a lot of weight too. 
The cost of a breach of trust can be, for instance, despising gaze, 
darkened reputation or excommunication. All of it does not involve any 
corporal loss but the damaging effects in emotional term cannot be " 
undermined. Moreover, sometimes moral sanctions involve excommunication 
(formal or informal) from social group_ It will utterly cut out the 
social network resource. Under such circumstance, future action is 
-
extremely difficult. For those who are not born to be criminal, moral 
sanction can be a serious deterrent of wrong doing. 
Before we examine Granovetter and Zucker's theories, two very 
important remarks should be added here. First, how is trust 
distinguished from distrust? If familiarity is a base of trust, it is 
also a precondit~on of distrust. Both 'trust' and 'distrust' are 
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patterned expectation towards others, though they r~n in different 
directions. The conclusion that 'a person is not trustworthy' is reached 
by repeated observations, or from other people's information. Compare 
the two sentences: 1)'1 know him well, he works poorly. I won't trust 
him'. 2) 'I know him well, 'he works very well'. He is trust worthy. The 
subtlety here is that in both cases, the trusters believe that the 
trustees will act according to their expectation {whether it is the 
intrinsic qualities of the trustees or the results of coercion is 
another matter} ~ . How 'trust' different from 'distrust' is, the former 
carries an affirmative expectation. For the latter, it is negative. 
Thus, trustworthiness always relative to the expectation of the · 
trusters. The point is, in distrusting, an entirely set of possibility 
is closed down for the truster. A whole new course of action will be 
formulated. 
Second, as it is mentioned before, trust is a risky investment. 
But what is risk? Risk is not an entity lying out there. Rather, it is 
closely associated with action. If one does not 'take' it, there will be 
no risk at all. 'It is purely an internal calculation of external 
conditions which create risk' (Luhmann 1988:100). However, without risk, 
trust is meaningless. 'Risk is at the same time inherent in action and 
exists only if the actor chooses to incur the chance of unfortunate 
consequences and to trust' (Luhmann 1988:100). If one choose not to act, 
he faces no ~1sk, and no trust is needed (but no gains too). One trusts, 
one will be having gains and more alternatives are opened to him i.e. 
the course of action is widened (Luhmann 1979:41). 
To sum up, two facets of trust are discussed. One is the bases of 
trust. To trust 'is to leap into uncertainty. However, there are two 
bases of trust that make trusting justifiable: familiarity and the 
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possibility of sanction. All trusting relationships, ,no matter it is 
interpersonal or between man and institution, are based on these two. 
Second, the unit of analysis. As implied from the first point, 
trust between individuals or between man and institution are not 
fundamentally dispara~e with each other. The trusting relationship at 
these two levels are still based on familiarity and possibility of 
sanction. 
Up to now, we have a 'general theory' of trust at hand. It is 
'general' in the"sense that it deals with all human rela~ions as a whole 
rather than a specific domain of it. To make it useful in our research, 
it will be used to scrutinize the existing literatures of economic 
sociology i.e. put it into the context of economic sociology. Moreover, 
to connect with an empirical study, we should look for a middle ranging 
theory to explicate the general notion of trust. It is fortunate that. 
the works of Granovetter and Zucker can act as the 'stepping stone' and 
bridge up the abstract to the concrete. In the following, we will see 
how Granovetter and Zucker portrait 'trust' on an individual and 
institutional level respectively. 
II" STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL NETWORK: GRANOVETTER'S NOTION OF TRUST 
The work of Granovetter provides a conception of trust on a 
relatively lower level of abstra'ction on the one hand, on the other hand 
it is concentrating on an rather interpersonal level. To understand his 
theory, we should .have some knowledge on his notion of economic 
sociology. 
Granovetter is ambitious. He ' was fighting a two-front war. He 
found the conception of man for both the economists and sociologists 
inadequate. In the view of Granovetter, in sociology, man is conceived 
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as 'oversocialized'. 'A conception of people as overwhelmingly sensitive 
to the opinions of others and hence obedient to the dictations of 
'sensually developed systems of norms and values' (Granovetter 
1985:483). In other word, it treats man as thoughtless follower of rules 
and norms. For the economists, man is 'undersocialized'. They are 
'assumed rational, self interested behavior affected minimally by social 
relations'. An ideal economic man is cool and abstracted from social 
ties. Social relations are treated ~s a 'frictional drag that impedes 
competitive market' (Granovetter 1985:484). Social atomization is the 
prerequisite to perfect competition. According to this line of thought, . 
economic action should be independent of social relations. 
For Granovetter, both the under- and over-socialized conceptions 
of man are, however, paradoxically similar in their ignorance of ongoing 
structures of-social relations. Both assume that action and decisions 
are carried out by atomized actors. In the undersocialized version, man 
is conceived as narrowly pursuing self interest in an utilitarian way. 
In the oversocialized version, behavioral patterns have been 
internalized by the a9tor and ongoing social relations have only 
peripheral effects on behavior. ·What they commonly neglected is the 
concrete· social relations In which action is embedded and the 
discretion/constraint that these relationships posit (Granovetter 
1985:485). Real actors do not hehave or decide as an actor outside of 
the social ~elation context. Their attempt at purposive action are 
embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of s6cial relations. In a word, 
'Granovetter's solution is 'bringing system of social relations' back in. 
After laying down the foundation of economic action, Granovetter 
proposed the problem of trust. The present writer find that the 
discussion of trust is an indispensable part of his theory of economic 
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action. The idea of 'embeddedness in structure of social relation' is, 
in a sensei a pre-m~ture formulation. It is because we are highly 
interested in to what extent, and how, that social relation and network 
condition economic action. If the system of social relation does not 
shape the course of economic action, it is meaningless to talk of 
embeddedness. Once the problem of embeddedness is addressed we need to 
assume that there are some forms of 'order' in social relations. Social 
networks, network resources should not be amorphous. They should not be 
fluid that can be changed easily. Otherwise, for instance, if it is a 
matter of contingency, there is no need for any sociological argument. 
The idea of an 'order' further implies that some ties are stronger than 
other (in a given time period). If the strength of all ties is a 
constant, and constraints posited should be constant also i.e. all 
social ties credit the same. If that is the case, bringing in network is 
meaningless. Thus, it is logical thus to infer that some networks are 
supposed to be more creditable than others and this 'micro structure' is 
in some form of stability. We expect that there are some form of 
'crystallization' or 'sedimentation' for the ongoing social relations so 
that a somewhat stable interactional pattern can be traced. Put it in 
another way, some ,ties are -stroriger and mor~ reliable than other. -That 
is why the recent development in social movement theory stresses the 
role of recruitment network but -at the same time view it as 'micro 
structure' (~qow et al 1980, Klandermans and Oegema 1987). If 
Granovetter wanted to make the enquiry fruitful, he needed to describe 
how the 'patterned' social relations works. Bringing in trust is a 
logical step. Hence in his literature, the peripheral role it takes is 
disappointing. ' . 
What is trust? Granovetter has not explicitly defined it. There 
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are some snapshots which help sorting out what he meant by trust. 
Better than the structure that someone is known to be 
reliable is information from a trusted informant that he has 
dealt with that individual and found him so. Even better is 
information from one's past dealings with that person. 
'[trust is] Mainly a function of whether they or their own _ 
contacts have had satisfactory past dealings with the other. 
(Granovetter 1985:491) 
Trust is the crystallization of satisfactory past dealings with 
others. One is trustworthy because he has demonstrated his prudence and 
providence repeatedly. It exhibits some form of 'pattern' and 'order'. 
One can tentatively term it, as social movement theorists coined the 
term, micro structure. 
Having this micro structure as tool, Granovetter then showed how 
it acts as rules and resources for social interaction. Needless to say, 
trust facilitates economic exchange. However, trust engendered by 
- personal relation may enhance opportunity for malfeasance. To trust 
someone will put one in a more vulnerable position than that of a 
stranger (Granovetter 1985:491). The pattern can facilitate exchange but 
at the same time it is a source of malfeasance. 
The merit of Granovetter is that he showed us how micro process 
determines economic action. After abandoning the oversocialized 
conception .of man, he rebuilt' the discours~ from a microscopic and 
interactional level. Actors are no longer be viewed as to be 
, introj ected' wi th various incen.ti ves and norms and to act according to 
the imperativ~s of social structure. However, a major flaw of his 
argument stems from here. One may find that .Granovetter's conception of 
economic action is a matter of interaction only. It is the micro 
structure that gives discretion and constraints to actors. Network is 
the key independent variable of economic action. As Granovetter himself 
put it, one of- the most important and least analyzedaspect of economic 
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sociology is the impact of macro changes on the social relations in 
which economic life embedded. What is the problem of this sort of 
thinking? 
We should be careful that social network is not the only factor 
that actors consider. What constitute the environment of an actor should 
not be the micro structure only - but also the macro structure. In 
short, any knowledgeable man will not only consider whether they have 
reliable agents. They will also investigate how reliable the background 
environment is • . For example, knowing a reliable local official in China 
does not imply a deal would be successful for the whole local government 
may be corruptive. It makes transaction unsafe too . . To zoom in too close 
to the concrete social relations, it makes one feel that having the 
social network means everything. It ign~res the fact that the whole 
structure of social relation is ~mbedded in a larier context. People 
will not trust the unreliable firms, governments as well as unreliable 
agents. Apart from the micro structure, they are also subjected to the 
-
discretion/constraints the wider environment posting on them. 
How is micro structure conditioned by macro structure? Three 
possible aspects can be identified by the present writer. 
1) The bound~ry of .micro structure. Ev~ry person should have met 
more that thousands of persons in their life. Some may be more 
'resourceful' than the other. Endowed with these large amount of network 
resources, does that meant we can do many things through that network? 
No, because not all the people we meet are trustworthy. Yes, because 
they can be the reliable if we spend a period of time to activate it. 
There are may cases when one sees an opportunity in his environment, 
sleeping ties are ~eactivated to exploit the chances. In these cases, 
considerations of macro environment preceded the micro structure. 
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2) The quality and quantity of social ties. Some people have more 
'useful' friend, some have friends who are not so useful, some do not 
have any friends at all. The diversity may be explained by personality 
and contingency. However, one should never ignore that the social 
position of actors will have effect on the network resource they are 
endowed with e.g. a police officer is more likely to know a lot of 
gangsters that an universlty lecturer do. The quality and quantity of 
social ties can be a function of other ,social variables. 
3) New ties ~ formation. Without successful past dealirig as 
reference, how to do business with strangers? It involves not only the 
problem of new ties formation i.e. how to build up (not utilize) trust 
with other, but also how to handle the cases that personalized trusting 
relationship ii inapplicable. Again, it can be solved by bringing in the 
macro consideration: How trustworthy is that ethnic group? How_ 
trustworthy is that trade? There are cases that we trust some one by his 
background (or position) rather than to trust himself. Here, again, the 
.salience of the wider environment is explicit. 
Granovetter's model fails to (or he did not attempt) leave space 
for a macro agend~. It is ,a major fault because, as we have discussed, 
the trust' in an individual cannot be easily separated from the wider 
environment. Lacking a macroscopic part makes his theory incomplete. 
Granovetter has envisaged th~t repeated satisfactory past dealings 
are a base of trust. However, this notion of trust limits the discussion 
on an interactional level. For Luhmann, satisfactory past dealing is 
3For this issue, Granovetter's defence is: 'But' the focus on proximate causes 
is intentional, for these broaden questions [the structural characteristics of the 
macro circumstances] cannot be satisfactory addressed without more detailed 
understanding of the mechanisms by which sweeping change has its effects. My claim is 
that one of the most ., important and least' analyzed of such mechanism is the impact of, 
such change on the social relations in which economic life is embedded'. 
(Granovetter 1985:506-7) 
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only one of the means to breed familiarity. Structure of social network 
matters for it is a base of familiarity. However, even in modern 
society, one should not deny that shared cultural background and kinship 
network could also provide high level of familiarity. Moreover, as the 
society become more and more complex, it is impossible to do business if 
satisfactory past dealing is the only way to secure trust. 
here. 
To conclude, Alexander's critique on micro sociology~ is relevant 
To privilege the arena of micro process may involve 'more 
than an empirical discovery; it may also involve theoretical 
mistake. It may rely upon assumptions that deny to the macro 
parameters of interaction any real determinant of this 
interaction itself. (Alexander 1988:307) 
To deal with the macro scene, we should look for the second 
approach: institutional production of trust. 
Ill. Institutional Production of Trust: Zucker and Shapiro 
The second approach is rather new. This approach views trust as an 
institutionally generated product rather than a pure interactional 
product. Theorists turn to study the trust producing mechanism and 
institutions rather than actors' perception of environment. The strength 
of this approach is that once trust is located in an institutional 
context, it is more possible to connect it with a macro agenda. It is 
more likely to see how institution~ shape individual orientation of 
trust. However,-as I am going to point out below, the two writers while 
. concentrating on the macro aspect, have not left space for an 
interactional level discussion. Their frameworks will be briefly 
discussed here. 
4The micro sociology are phenomenology, symbolic interactionism and exchange 
theory. 
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In the hand of Shapiro, the problem of 'trust' is utterly 
different from that of Granovetter's. Her query is 'How do societies 
control trust relationships that are not embedded in structures of 
personal relations?' (Shapiro1987:623) While Granovetter argued that 
social relations are mainly responsible for the production of trust in 
economic life, she explored 'the flip side of Granovetter's thesis' 
(Shapiro 1987:624). Her argument is that in real life, there are many 
instances that we trust someone not by · personal relation. The relation 
of trust can be very impersonal. For example, with the weakening of 
extended family, the state and formal organizations offer substitutes 
for kinship to cater for the needs of the young, elderly and infirm. 
Parents entrusts their children to day care workers, teachers, to 
foundations and to probate or surrogate counts. Employers transfer 
custodj6r their property to secretaries, clerks, truck drivers, 
assembly workers and guards (Shapiro 1987:626). Common network of social 
relations shared by principal and agent may provide a sufficient 
incentive for trust but not a necessary one. Moreover, to facilitate 
exchange, e.g. a surgery, the agent (patient) have to grant a certain 
discretion to principals (doctors). A crucial problem is how to make ~ the 
principals properly deliver their duties yet does not abuse the 
discretion they are granted with. For Granovetter the answer will be the 
utilization of informal social control, but · this does not always work. 
Although, as Sh~piro recognized, agent sometime may employ various means 
of personalized social control to sanction principals, but there are 
still many circumstances that this form of control becomes irrelevant. 
These cases may occur- when 
1), agency relationship are not embedded in networks of 
social relations. 2), relationships are episodic rather than 
continuing. 3) principals are 'one-shatter' and agents 
'repeat-players'. 4) Principals cannot evaluate agent 
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performance (because they lack access or expertise, are 
literally incompetent, or are committed to future ' 
transactions, and necessary await delivery on agent 
promises). 5) agents have actual possession of principals' 
property and, therefore, exit may not be a viable option 
for aggrieved principals, oi 6) a~ency offerings are not 
easily rescinded on reversed (e.g. surgery). 
(Shapiro 1987:635) 
How CRn impersonal exchange be adequately checked? The solution is 
paradoxical. To overcome the problem of impersonal exchange, that is to 
say, to produce trust in an impersonal exchange relation, the social 
organizations of distrust are installed so that distrust is 
institutionalized. 'All efforts to reduced uncertainty - whether through 
familiarity, reciprocity, threats of sanction, procedural rules, 
policing, compensatory side bets, or whatever - seek t~ induce trust. 
Personalized control that Granovetter proposed is but one of the means. 
Zucker put 'trust' in a much wider context. His enquiry is: why do 
the whole economy, specific sectors, industries, and individual firms 
come to be organized in the way they do (Zucker 1986:54)? It is a very 
broad query indeed. He suggested a unified approach that treat social 
variables as causes rather than consequence of economic exchange. The 
theme is that 'disruption- of trust through such factors as high rates of 
immigration, coupled with pressure to engage in transaction across group 
boundaries and geographic distance, caused the ' production of formal 
' structures within and between firms designed to produce. Informal, 
interpersonal trust was supplemented or replaced' (Zucker 1986:54). 
Three mode~ of trust producing measures are identified by ZuckeJ. 
5nefinition of trust Zucker offered runs a very interpretative manner and it 
cannot be found how it adequately links with the rest of his argument. Trust has two 
major components! 
1) Background ., expectations, the common understandings that are "taken for 
grantedtt as part of a world in common •••••• 
Z) Constitutive ' expectations, the rules defining the context or situation ••• 
It does not seem that this definition is meaningfully connected with his main argument. 
It would not be discussed further. 
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First, process-based trust, where trust is tied to past or expected 
exchange such as in reputation or gift exchange. For this mode of trust 
production measure, a record of satisfactory past dealings, obtained 
secondhand or firsthand, provides data to the exchange process. In 
general, a considerable amount of person-specific or firm-specific 
information is required. Second, characteristic-based, where trust is 
tied to person. This mode 'depends on characteristic such as family 
background or ethnicity. Factors like ethnicity, heredity are highly 
valued. These factors matter because social similarity is a source of 
information. Third, institutional-based, where trust is- tied to broad 
societal institutions depending on individual or firm-specific 
attributes (e.g. certification as an accountant) and on intermediary 
mechanisms (e.g. one of escort accounts). Formal mechanisms are used to 
provide trus-t th~t does not rest on personal characteristics or on past 
exchange history. This mode of trust can be invested in via education, 
or marketed by a sale of services designed to increase trust between 
parties in an exchange (Zucker 1986:60-61). He argued that process-based 
trust were dominant in .and before mid-1800s. This mode of trust 
production measures is supposed to be workable in a static community as 
building up process-based trust takes very long time. Characteristics:" 
based trust is especially the label of traditional society. 
Owing to enormous social and economic changes, he identified as 
high rates of · international and intra-national immigration, and 
instability of business enterprises, brought about the disruption of 
process-based and characteristic-based trust; It is because the rapidly 
changing society leaves no time for a person to breed these two mode of 
trust. Moreover, ,~S exchanges across different social groups and across 
long geographic distance become common, and as exchange become more and 
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more universalistic and impersonal, several trust producing institutions 
were needed to regenerate trust in the business community. The rises of 
professions, regulation, law and legislation as trust producing 
mechanisms are thus crucial. 
This approach is eye catching because trust is commonly viewed as 
something interpersonal and emotional. The theorists dared to claim that 
it can be produced and manipulated. Nevertheless, it suffers from the 
following defects. 
A fundamental problem is, how do trust producing measures produce 
trust? When we say 'production of trust', are we assuming that trust can 
be produced like drugs and one can go to market to purchase a portion of 
it to solve problems? Obviously trust is not as concrete as medicine. If 
that is the case, how trust can be produced and how can the produced 
trust be utilized? From the outset, we should have a clear idea of the 
nature of trust so that we may know how it can be produced and how it is 
utilized. Zucker's treatment is weak here. The various defects are 
-
rooted in lacking a good definition of trust (see note 5). 
Among the three modes of trust producing mechanism, institutional-
based trust is -the most curious issues. For Zucker, the fast changing 
society allow no space for process-based and characteristic-based .trust. 
Rules and formal structures dominated; {ormalization and 
hierarchy within the finance, economic sectors governing 
transactions between firms and society wide regulations and 
legislation governing transactions. In other words, 
production of trust was accomplished by formalized and 
standardization: audit were the by word, regulation become 
the sin qua non of modern business, and legally enforceable 
contracts proliferated. (Zucker 1986:91) 
What are the trust producing institutions? He listed the 
bureaucratic organization, the professionals, social overhead sectors 
and law and legislation as trust producing. However, can we accept that 
bureaucratic control, lawsuit and professional auditing are all the same 
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kind of trust producing mechanism? It is hard to link bureaucratic 
control with trust and he did not tell us why he could do so. Zucker has 
only laid down the general pattern of modern trust producing measures 
and left it unspecified that how an institution can be recognized as 
trust producing mechanism and ,how they work. This may appear over-
demanding for Zucker was only interested in a rather general level. Why 
insurance company is trust' producing mechanism is not his main concerns. 
Lacking a clear demarcation of trust makes it difficult to deal with the 
detail mechanism of trust producing. We do not know how to categorize 
the measures in a meaningful wa~. 
Another shortcoming is closely related to the former one. To 
generate institutional-based trust is costly. Just to think of the cost 
of hiring a solicitor or auditor. Moreover, even if we ignore the cost, 
one may find some trust producing agents, e.g. auditors, to a certain 
extent living on their clients. Moreover, the data for auditing are also 
provided by clients. Although the professional ethics disdains 
malfeasance, there are incentives foi them to 'cook the book' for 
clients or at least pr~ducing partial reportage (Shapiro 1987:645). That 
is why for most companies, the audit financial statement are often 
different from the company statements. It is questionable whether the " 
'institutional mechanism' can produce enough trust for economic 
activities. If we regard the 'coer~ive measures' e.g. rules, regulations 
and court as the producing mechanism, the 'sufficiency' of trust being 
produced is also doubtful. Not because the systems do not work. But 
because, first, punishment cannot always cover the losses of trusters. 
Second, no matter how severe the punishment is, it cannot totally 
6His treatment' of process based. trust and characteristics based trust suffer 
from the similar shortcoming. However, the two are not the focus of this part so it 
will not be handled it here. 
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eliminate the possibility of breaching trust. To rely solely on 
punishment does not seem sensible. 
In spite of the above drawbacks, a major advantage of this 
approach is that once 'trust' is linked with institutions, then we are 
in a better position to loc~te the influences of the wider social and 
economic environment. For example, the audit system, judicial system can 
be trust producing measures. It is reasonable to infer that characters 
of these systems and how they get along with clients will have effects 
on how people trust. Tentatively speaking, the 'trustworthiness' 
criteria they imposed may systematically but negatively stigmatized 
several social groups so that the latter are forbidden from certain 
· ~ctivities. Introducing 'impersonal trust' also help us deal with the 
problems of new ties formation. Before any interpersonal social control 
is possible, trusters can rely on the impersonal information that the 
trustees .presented to assess the trustworthiness. From this angle, the 
role of trustees' social location (e.g. the firms they engaged in) and 
resources endowment (e.g. how much deposits they have) can be handled 
here. That is why using impersonal trust is a better strategy to locate 
the macroscopic factors. 
Zucker's insight is that he could map out the role of 
institutional measures to 'produce' trust. It is an incomplete notion 
for he did not attempt to formulate discussion on the truster - trustee 
level so tha~trust is treated as manufacturing goods and various 
conceptual difficulties arise. We know that few people solely rely on 
rules and regulation and audit report to do business. While we recognize 
its importance, in real life,. the so called 'non contractual' relations 
is also vital. If .the institutionally produced trust suffers from many 
defects, what measures actor will take to supplement the inadequacy? Are 
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the process-based and characteristic- based trust no longer be useful in 
transaction? 
CONCLUSIONS 
How do Granovetter and Zucker's works help develop a notion of 
trust? Following our discussion on the beginning of this chapter, 
Luhmann's writing allow us to locate the two theories of trust in . proper 
perspective. From the onset, there are two bases of trust: familiarity 
and possibility of sanction. 
For familiarity, we may further probe that in real transaction, To 
be familiar with other actors is not enough.· Granovetter's notion is 
inadequate for he implied that social network meant everything. If we 
think success in making money is not only a problem of network resource 
but also the wider context one engaged in, to ensure they would yield a 
profit, the entrepreneurs should also be familiar with the status of 
their partners' firms, the industry they engaged and even the wider 
social and political milieu. The trusters not only beware of the 
possible deliberate fraud of the trustees, they are also highly aware of 
the potential difficulties of their firms, and the effects of macro 
trends on' trustees. Problems in the above two aspects would ruin the' 
trustees' standing, regardless how prudent they are. "It is here that " 
Zucker termed 'institutional measures' play a great role. 
Inspired by reading of Luhmann, it is found that what Zucker termed 
'institutional measures' should be divided into two. The first category 
'producing trust' (in Zucker words) by producing familiarity7. 
This category includes various usage of reporting measures like 
7 The present ' writer refrains from using , trust producing measures' for these 
institutionalized forms of presentation would carry not only affirmative message i.e. 
some one is trustworthy, but also the negative message. It yields trust as well as 
distrust. 
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auditing, accounting, credit information services and various 
information agencies. These 'familiarity producing measures' aim at 
using standardized reporting scheme and notion to present the 
information of trustees to trusters so that transaction is possible even 
without previous cooperatio~. The familiarity producing measures bring 
the previous 'unknown' (with respect to the trusters) into 'known'. 
The second category of trust is the possibility of sanction. It 
corresponds with the second category of institutional-based trust 
producing measures. I call it 'structure of possible sanction'. Various 
measures are devised - legal arrangement, bureaucratic structure, 
payment structure and moral sanction etc. - to shape the motivational 
structure of trustees so that their action are predictable (though not 
definitive) for the cost of violating these sanctioning scheme is 
calculable. It is also a means that the trusters employ to evaluate the 
riskiness of transactions. Moral sanction matters too. Violation of 
agreed norms, or betraying a cadet would result in intensive moral 
condemnation. Sometimes, it is more damaging than economic losses. Even 
we disregard the emotional cost of it, it ruins the available networks. 
Future action becomes extreme difficult. To following this line of 
thought, we may see· how the legal . arrangements are structured so th~t 
the cost of malfeasance can be predicted and the readiness of trust can 
be estimated. We may also invest~gate how these measures, for various 
reasons, indirectly forbid certain social groups from conducting some 
business. 
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The following figure is a sum up of the various aspects of trust. 
Trust --~ 
--------~ Individual Level 
Familiarity ---------~ Organizational Level 
--------~ Wider Environment 
Possibility of ----~ Moral Sanction 
Sanction -------
----- Formal Arrangement 
Figure 3.1 The Various Aspects of Trust 
We have spend a lot of effort in the concept of 'trust'. How can 
it help make sense of the Hong Kong scene? As discussed in the former 
paragraphs, economic sociologists in Hong Kong face a difficult task for 
we have few state imperatives to account for and the free market IS 
dominant. Bringing in trust is an attempt to study how the 'non-
economic' elements shaped economic activities and to apply sociological 
concepts in explaining economic behavior under the laissez faire 
economy. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TRUST: ON THE POSSIBILITY OF SANCTION 
How can the theory of trust help us make sense of the relationship 
between bankers and industrialists that uncovered in the first chapter? 
Firstly, one should be clear about the salience of trust· in lending. A 
major problem is, why should bankers trust the people to whom they lend 
money? ,From the onset, we 'should recognize that bankers and 
manufacturers are different persons. They have divergent concerns, they 
face different constraints, and are granted with different discretion. 
In short, they occupy-different position in the institutional setting. 
It is suggested that the relative positions they occupy in the 
institutional setting make trust a crucial element of lending. Secondly, 
-
how is trusting relationship built and maintained? Given the constraints 
-,' 
faced by b~ers, what measures will they take to establish that 
relation? For us, the most interesting issue is how these measures 
systematically sgreen out potential .clientsso that ' some sectors receive 
few bank finance although they contribute so much to the economy. 
In this chapter, we will b~gin our discussion of the salience of 
trust in ban~ lending. Firstly, the lending procedure will be described 
to give readers a picture of how a bank works so as to facilitate 
further discussion. Then, the relative positions of the two parties, 
bankers and manufacturers in ,the institutional setting will be compared 
for it will gre~tly affect their outlook on lending. Finally, we will 
describe the sanction mechanism that the bankers will use and to see how 
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it works (and does not work). 
I. THE LENDING PROCEDURE 
For most of the banks (apart from the syndicated loans) the 
lending procedures are similar. For example, firstly, an existing client · 
refers his friend to a banker, then a preliminary interview will be 
conducted by marketing officers to obtain a general impression of the 
client. In practice, if one is not a desirable client for the bank, he 
will be screened out by the front line officers. They throw him out by 
charging an unreasonably high interest rate, or cutting down the 
requested facilities to a very low level. If he passes the first 
screening, the banker will request the client's bank statements, 
financial statements and audit statements to check the performance of 
his firm. Moreover, security will be asked for. -The concerned officer 
will prepare a credit proposal! to state the purposes of the loan, 
facilities asking for, past performance of the firm, other credit 
information and security offered. Usually, the proposal will be 
submitted to an independent work team to make comments and appraisals. 
Finally a credit committee composed of senior staffs will scrutinize the 
proposal · and make the final approval on the .request. The locus of final 
approval depends ' on the amount asked for and the standing of the client. 
For smaller amount, the lower rank staffs have the discretion to 
approve. For. a big loan, the senior staffs in the central office will be 
involved. If it is a foreign bank, the proposal may be sent to the 
foreign central office for final approval. For the current clients that 
have showed marked irregularities, the proposal will also be handled by 
1In ordinary ~saget 'proposal' means' scheme that put forward for consideration' • 
In bankers' language, it means a file or a case record rather than a 'proposed scheme'. 
That is why proposals can be renewed. 
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higher ranking staffs for it may need special treatment. Proposals will 
be renewed in a period of time. For most of the banks it is one year, 
for some it is six months. In the renewal, credit worthiness of clients 
will be reevaluated. 
Apart from term 10ans2 and various hire purchasing facilities, 
usually loans are provided in the form of credit line. Brief, it means 
that the bank grants a right to the borrowers to draw money in a 
designed form (OD, LIC, TR) below a certain total amount. When and how 
much money needed is solely the decision of borrowers. Moreover, 
although it is not a welcomed practice from the bankers point of view, 
clients have the rights of not making use their facilities at all. For 
example, a client is offered with one million OD, he gets the right to 
draw it at any time and in any amount that cumulative sum does not 
exceed the cap. Interest is charged from the moment he draws money to 
the day he settles the OD. Other short and medium term facilities, like, 
LIC, and TR follow the same logic. 
II. TRUST AND LENDING 
Why is trust so important in lending? Lenders want to make money 
in lending. If borrowers fail to repay, they incur losses. So they need 
to trust their borrowers. "However, the situation is more complicated 
than we expected as the different positions in the institutional setting 
of "the two p~r:ties - bankers and borrowers - take will determine their 
views on that" dea13. 
2It refers to the loans that have a considerable amount and repayable in a long 
period. 
3Here , the word 'determine' should not be equated with 'dictate'. Even if they 
are 'determined' to "do so, incumbents in certain positions still have a large latitude 
of action. However, the cost they would bear is enormous if they act otherwise. In this 
case, most likely they would find only certain options viable. It is not worthwhile to 
invest so much effort to change the custom (see Alexander, 1988) though making changes 
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We should first distinguish the positions of the two players in 
the wider institutional setting. It is, on the one hand, the lending 
managers (the banker side) and on the other the industrial 
entrepreneurs. Both sides' main concern is profit. On the bankers' side, 
as a whole, they lend money to earn the interest spread, handling 
charges and commission. If the deal involves foreign exchange, for 
example, trade financing~ the banks can also make money from the 
transaction of foreign currency. In the past, lending is the only source 
of bank income. In modern banking, to increase revenue special 
investment branches are developed to engage in foreign exchange and 
other investment activities. Nevertheless, the weight of lending is 
still heavy. 'If a bank does it very bad in lending, it just cannot 
survive' (David). On the other hand, for the manufacturers, they borrow 
money from bank, pay some interests, and make use of the sum to do their 
own desired profitable investment. Manufacturers have many concerns: 
product market, labor, raw materials etc. Finance is one of them. 
In a sense, their interests are complementary. The more money 
bankers lend out, the more money they earn from the interest spread. The 
same is true for industrialists, the more money they obtain from banks, 
the more possibilities are opened to them. As a result they are in a 
better position to do business. According to ~ this logic, bankers like to 
lend more and manufacturers want to borrow more. 
Howeve~t their interests do not· always coincided. By common sense, 
the population of potential borrowers far exceed the capacity that banks 
can accommodate. For borrowers, given an acceptable interest rate, they 
would have the incentive to borrow as much as possible. However, it is 
impossible ·· for tQ.e banks to fulfil their wants infinitely. The main 
is not impossible (there are cases that the lender 'act otherwise') (see chapter 4). 
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problem is not fund management, though it should be taken into 
consideration. The point . is, if borrowers have the incentives to cheat -
not to repay - a grave problem confronting money lenders of all forms -
including banks, financial companies, private lending and usurer - is 
that how to ensure borrowers will repay in the future? Predicting the 
future is an inherent part of all forms of lending i.e. to predict which 
one will repay in the future. However, the future comprises far too many 
possibili ties than lenders can manage .. Even for the loan sharks, who use 
naked violence to uphold their creditors' interest, they do not always 
win. How to manage the situation if they have to lend to make a profit? 
Unfortunately, there is no perfect· way to ensure one will repay unless 
they stop lending at all. 
In general, to be conservative may be the solution. For all kinds 
of mQney lenders, they have every reason to be conservative. Whatever 
they lost, for example, in case of a client fraud, the loss may 
neutralize a substantial portion of the annual income. On an 
-
organizational level, bankers have the reasons to be conservative, that 
apart from the profit motive. As a banker told me, 
Comparatively speaking, yes, we are more conservative than 
industrialists. Doq.'t forget that we have different duties. 
For industrialists, they are playing with their own money. 
But ·we· are playing wi th other · people "si money. We have 
responsibility to the executives, the shareholders and to 
the depositors, i.e. the general public~ And we have 
responsibility to the market in general as well. For a 
financial institution, stability is very important. If you 
incur too much loss due to reckless lending and finally the 
bank collapse, it is a public issue and it shakes the public 
confidence. It ·is a real big danger (David). 
If the major cause of difficulties in bank is often mismanaged lending, 
then proper lending strategy has to be upheld to maintain its good 
health. 
At the individual level, the lending manager and the related 
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staffs, i.e. the marketing officers, the account managing officers, also 
have the reasons to be cautious. Modern banks, unlike pawn shops, 
usually are complex organizations with hierarchical management 
structures. Lending managers are subjected to various supervision. In 
case of a client fraud, they are at the risk of losing year end bonus, 
or even their job. Obviously if they do the job well they have better 
prospects. But if organizational checks are less efficient than market, 
and they wi 11 not receive commission ·for successful deals, they have 
every reasons to be cautious. 
Moreover, banks deal with money - an asset with the highest 
liquidity. For employees, incentives t6 che~t banks are especially high. 
Thus usually bank have independent internal supervisory department to 
watch over the conduct of all employees e.g. from the exact amount of 
cash in tellers' drawers to the approval 9f syndicated loans. The 
lending related staffs are being checked constantly if the policy 
guideline is violated. Violations should be backed with sound 
justifications. Hence, as bureaucrats, they are conservative. As banking 
bureaucrats, they are .even more conservative. That is why it is commonly 
conceived that banks are one of the most stable institution (just a 
li ttle bit less t.hat the government) and it is a stable career to work 
in banks. 
No pain, no gain. It is esp~cially true for lending managers. They 
can eliminate-all risk only if they refrain from action entirely. The 
latter, however, is utterly impossible for lending money is their job. 
How to deal with this annoying situation is a real problem for them. 
They have to find some devices to protect their best interest. 
At the other end of the stage is borrowers. Here, we consider only 
one kind of borrower: the manufacturers. When do they need money? 
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Probably ever since they have desired to establish a factory. Funds are 
required for initial materials, labor costs, equipment rent and other 
general expenses, As the firm becomes more well established, it may need 
a larger premise, more materials and more workers. Bank facilities are 
especially needed in the imp,ort of raw materials and export of products. 
They need banks to provide them mediate the transaction between foreign 
and the local end (see the discussion on the documentary of credit 
· ·~ · system, chapter 1) (Brodribb 1991: 12) ., I f they want to expand their 
bU3iness and bank finance, and other external source of finance are not 
available, then a prolonged period of ploughing back is needed. If the 
industrial sector as a whole receives little external finance) some 
theorists suggested that economic development will be retarded. 
On an organizational level, industrial firms are more independent 
then banks. Externally, banks are supposed to be responsible ~o the 
general public, i~tiividual industrial firms are much less influential to 
the whole economy, If a single factory is closed down, no matter how 
large it is, .in Hong Kong, it will -not cause much disturbance as a bank 
run. Internally, since most organization of them are partnership or 
sole-proprietorship, they are playing with their own money, at the most 
their executives' money. They are ' not . responsible to the sharehold~rs or 
general public. In the Hong Kong context, the owner-managers are usually 
coincident and they are thus su~jected to much less bureaucratic 
constraints. then their banking counterpart. 
The background of the two parties are also different. For the 
lending officers, almost all of them are either tertiary institutions 
graduates or professional qualifications holders (see Table 3.1). 
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Table 3.1 
Level of Preferred Education for the Credit Related Staffs, 1986 (%1 
Job Title Post Secondary AI8 108 Stage I ProfeSSional ProfeSSional Higher Matriculation Total 
Qualification Diploma Certificate or Below 
Credit Manager 93.87 4 .06 1.53 0 0 0 0 100 
Loan Manager 94.46 3.07 0 .77 0 1.15 0 0 lOO 
Credit Supervisor 64.72 15.74 0.58 1. 75 11 .37 2.62 3.21 100 
Loan Supervisor 35.41 28.43 2.24 O.S 16.2 5 12.22 100 
Credit Analvst 43.17 15:42 4 .85 6 . 17 16.3 2.64 11.45 lOO 
Trade and Credit 44.05 16.17 1.2 2.38 22 .62 9.52 0 lOO 
Informallon 
$unerv.sor 
Source : R"nort 01 the Man Power Survey 01 the Bank.lng InrJustrv . 1986. 
For the manufacturers (especially the bulk of the small entrepreneurs), 
most of them received only secondary education (see Table 3.2). Although 
they are relatively more well educated than the general population, they 
are far behind the bankers. 
Table 3.2 · 
Educacional A ttainmenc of Encrepreneurs 
Educacion Entrepreneurs Populations Entrepreneurs 
1978· (%1 1981 (%1 1987 (%1 
No Schooling 501 16.1 . 4.3 
Primary 36.4 34 .2 27.5 
Secondary 48.9 43 55.8 
Tertiary 9.6 6.7 12.3 
Total 100 100 100 
Source: Sit and Wong 1989:99 Table 8.1 
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It is an interesting encounter. On the one hand are the 
bureaucrats, who have a university degree in hand, emphasize stability 
and prudence, and with their prospect hinging on their own decisions. 
They are responsible for the health of the banks and they also have some 
concerns for the stability of local community. One the other are the 
hard working, autonomous and less well educated industrial 
entrepreneurs. Both sides like the deals to be successful but the 
bankers constantly fear that the borrower would run away. 
In this situation, what will the bankers do to handle the problem 
of defraud? Trust is the solution. Not because trust fills up the gap, 
but in trust ,. they make a leap of fai th across the gap. Where does trust 
come from? As discussed above, there are two major bases of trust: 
familiarity and possibility of sanction. In the following parts of this 
chapter, we will discuss how does the possibility of sanctions work in 
the process of lending in Hong Kong and how does it disfavor 
industrialists will be discussed. 
One should note that sanction and familiarity are the 
complementary bases of trust. They are both the tools to tackle 
uncertainty. On the one hand, one gets familiar with his partners and 
thus hi~ future activity become predictable. On ·the other hand, one may 
not be familiar ' with his trading partners but the possibility of 
sanction makes the future behavio.r of the latter predictable. The 
enforcement .of sanction is damaging to the trustees. The gist of 
sanction is that the damage trustees are expected to bear would reshape 
his motivational structure so that breaching of trust wotild not 
feasible. Sanction is the means to block alternatives and to narrow the 
range of options., ·In this circumstance, trusters are subjected to less 
uncertainty for the possibility of deliberate fault is minimized. 
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However, it is possible that some environmental disturbances may make 
either deliberate fault a viable option or render the trustees unable to 
repay. In other words, there are some environmental factors that make 
default a -viable option even considering the damaging effect. That is 
why sanction alone cannot ensure one to repay. However, without the 
incentive to malfeasance is enlarged. 
Taking one step forward, the weight of familiarity and sanction is 
also supplementary with each other. At· a low level of familiarity, the 
Height of possibility of sanction will be prominent. In some extreme 
. ~ ~ , . 
cases the business decisions might be made solely against the 
possibility of sanction. In case of a high level of familiarity, the 
Height of sanction diminished. Again, decisions could be made solely on 
the basis of a very high level of familiarity to the trustees. However, 
in real life, the two aspects are intertwining. In economic transaction, 
it is not sensible to base on only one of the aspects. 
To sum up, all lending decisions are inherently risky. If lenders 
want to have their money back, they must use some devices to ensure the 
borrowers will repay in the future. The various legal arrangements 
concerning indemnity and security aim at solving this problem. In the 
following part, how sanctions work and fail will be discussed. To 
facilitate further discussions on bank lending, the normal lending 
procedure of the common commercial banks will be described briefly 
first. 
Ill. ON SECURITY ••• AND THE DRAWBACKS 
In bank lending, the sanctioning mechanism can only be legal. It 
is so tempting to', borrow the money and run away. Morality alone is not 
powerful enough ;to monitor the action of borrower. For bankers, they are 
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especially interested in the sanctions that can at the same time puni~h 
the borrowers and cover their loss. To put one in jail is meaningless 
for the money lost cannot be recovered (in Hong Kong, the expenditure to 
put someone in jail is paid by creditors). Security is thus a good 
disciplinary measure for bankers. Security can fulfil this function 
because when there is a breach of trust, the trustee would risk bearing 
an enormous damages i.e . . losing the security. In most situations, it 
makes breaching an unsound alternative. Moreover, taking over security 
can, in principle, cover the loss of bankers. 
In traditional lending principle, security should be the last 
resort only and the weight of it should never exceed the weight of the · 
borrowers' standing. However, in practice, it is a very important 
concern, though it is difficult to assess whether it is the most 
important. Without security, one cannot hope -to borrow money from bank. 
There are two major forms of security: intangible and tangible. 
For both the principle is the same. If one fails to repay, bank has the 
-
right to take over borrower's properties to settle loans. The intangible 
form of security appears as various forms of 'name lending', That is, 
the lending is against the name of borrowers (or the guarantors). The 
borrowers/guarantors must be very . famous persons or have a very long 
term relation with the bank and is found particularly trustworthy, For 
example, a Legislative Councillo~ is more likely to borrow money from 
the bank ·without any tangible security. Another example is the listed 
companies. In practice, all listed companies can obtain bank financing 
on clean base - loans that are· not secured by any tangible security. 
Before a firm goes public, it will inform his bankers that it will do so 
and is prepared to release all pledged security. Once it is listed, a 
corporate guarantee will be granted to all of its subsidiaries and they 
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can get money from banks on clean base too. 
Does it mean name lending leave few possibili ties of sanction.? Not 
exactly. One should rather say that in name lending, ba~k control is 
weak and covert. The favor of sanction is diluted for it seems that 
lending is based solely on the fame of clients. However, after all 
borrowers have to indemnity. They hold legal responsibility if they fail 
to repay. Even so, it is different from lending against tangible 
security, for even indemnity is signed, there are nothing tangible in 
bankers' hand. The banks are in a less secure position because it is not 
impossible for the borrowers/guarantors to go bankruptcy or simply run 
away, though it is not very likely in reality. As a view of sanction, 
intangible security offers bankers less protection. The acceptance of 
name lending signifies, banker finds a particular client's p future 
action highly predictable and .hence sanction is being withdrawn to the 
background. We, we can clearly see that given familiarity a high 
level(the famous person, the listed companies), preparation for explicit 
sanction is less salient. 
The use of tangible security is much more common than the 
intangible. Except for the very large clients, most lending are against 
some forms of tangible securities. In the textbook version, a good 
security should have stable market value, high marketability, high 
ascertainability, easy for storage and easy to take title. Antiques and 
paintings are not good securities. Again, in textbook versions, the 
usual security range from: Premises and building, stocks and other 
securities, gold bullion and coin, insurance policy, fixed deposit, 
inventory, ships, machinery and post-dated check. In practice, only a 
very narrow range of them will be considered. Machinery, according to 
the respondents, is not a. good security since it depreciates quickly • . 
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After one to two years of operation, the resale value may drop to zero. 
Most of the interviewees pointed out that machinery must not be taken as 
security. In effect, deposit is the best. If one wants to put money as 
security, they are required to put the sum in the designated bank in 
some form of time deposit. A ,legally binding agreement will be made to 
ensure that incase of the borrowers' failure to repay, the bank can 
claim the title of the mriney. Properties and shares are also good 
securities but they have their deficiencies. For shares, bankers will 
accept only blue -chips (Peter, David) for the market prices are stable. 
'How can the bankers manage the red chip with market price tripled in 
one day and halved in the next day?' (David). Moreover, even for the 
blue chips, the credit committee members are also anxious about any 
signs of abig crash in the stock market. In case of share prices 
tumbling, the bankers will immediat~ly cut the facilities. It is a 
" 
mechanism for bankers to protect themselv~s. For instance, if the 
security is worth a million, an eight hundred thousands' facilities 
-
might be appro~~d. If the security's value drops by a half (it is 
worthies only five hu~dred thousands), then a net three hundred 
thousands is 'exposed' i.e. it is not covered by any security. In case 
of fraud, no matter i t - is a deliberate fraud or the firm winding up, 
bank cannot cover ' their loss even if the shares are sold. Thus the value 
of share as security is constantly checked and adjusted. 
Property is the most commonly used security. In Hong Kong, 
property is a good security. Unlike Britain and Canada, the prices of 
various properties are rising most of the time. The property market -does 
not face much pres~ure for a downturn. For new clients, banks usuallT 
accept only a cer.tain percent of its market value, usually eighty 
percent,as the value of security. For instance, if a flat is priced one 
77 
million in the market, it is worth only eighty hundred thousands as a 
security. This calculus is to protect banker-s from minor fluctuation in 
property value. In the annual renewal of credit proposal, the value of 
property will be reviewed so that a designed proportion of credit 
against security can be main~ained. 
Different kinds of property are ranked differently in the bankers' -
eyes. The residential property ranked first for its market is ~lways 
robust. It is good in case the security needs to taken over (see below). 
Commercial building is ranked second and industrial premises the lowest. 
Here, we may see that bankers try their very best to protect their 
own interest. In lending, they are always prepared ' for various measures 
to cover their losses in case borrowers fail to repay. If that is the 
case, is sanction all the bankers need? What is the significant of the 
possibility of sanction? What is its short-comings? 
In effect, bankers are not inclined to take over security to cover 
clients' debt. One of the reason . is that it will damage the bank's 
public image. If a bank always take over their clients' property, the 
general public may find it harsh. The bankers will consider their brand 
name seriously. 
" 
Another reasons is that the cost of taking over security ' is high 
(especially property) and exceedingly time consuming. Before any lending . 
is made, borrowers are required tQ pledged their property to the banks. 
That is to say, in case they fail to repay, the bank has the right to 
take over the property. Even assuming the whole process run smoothly (it 
may not be the case ,in practice), the procedure from taking over 
property to obtaining money is: very complicated. The decision of taking 
over is in itself , complicated enough. The responsible lending team 
should get approval from the branch m~nager, and the branch manager 
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should get approval form the central office to decide whether they 
should take over the property. In this period, . many internal paper works 
are required. Then, in general, the banker will go to the court for the 
co~rt order for payment of the debt. That means the court recognizes 
that the client has borrowed the banker's money and the latter has the 
right to take over the securities. It is not the end of the story for 
even the title is taken, it is not easy to turn a flat into money. 
Firstly, bankers will not let the ppoperty companies handle the deal for 
they may make too much profits from it. Moreover, although banks can 
" - ;i 
get a better term if they wait for the bloom of property market, they 
tisually will not do so for it will only prolon~ the process~ They will 
put it on auction as soon as possible. In an auction, the price is 
likely to be much lower than the market value. The whole process usually 
takes as long as half a year. Even the property is sold, the money 
obtained may not be enough to settle the loan. It is because the sum 
obtained will be used to settle loans and then to cover the handling 
charges. If money obtained cannot cover the two items, bank runs a 
deficit (Yeung)~. 
Perhaps the most important reason for refraining from taking over , 
security is that it violates the principle of lending. Bankers' 
philosophy is that the bank should grow with clients. They make money 
from interest, commission and handling charges. When clients grow, banks 
can generate-.~ore profit from doing business with them. Security should 
only be the last resort. In case clients cannot repay the loaDs, they 
use the securi ty fo 'r repayment. However, it is bad for a banker because 
it means that the banker lose~ that business. It is a case in which both 
41n that case, bankers will negotiate with solicitors to have a better bargain 
for the handling charges. It ' is not impossible for the bankers and solicitors are 
fellows i.e. they usually have a long corporation relation. 
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side lose. That IS why even if there are tangible securities pledged to 
banks, bankers try all means to' refrain from making use of it. 
Taking over security is not a welcomed situation for the 
r~sponsible lending manager too. No because it is time consuming, but it 
implies the manager is inept. For lending manager, the best monitoring 
is to screen out all potentially dangerous firms so as to wipe out the 
possible of losing money. , The good enough management is to ensure that 
the company is financially viable and then keep on lending. Otherwise, 
if it is found showing signs of difficulties, the credit manager should 
tighten control, to cut facilities at renewal, or even forces the 
clients to repay in schedule (again, by hook or by crook) and then never 
touches on them any more. Such measures ~re reasonable for bankers 
though it may be damaging for clients. Nevertheless, they will not wait 
to take , action until their clients write off. If it resorts to taking 
over property, it is a worse situation and the relevant account manager 
will be discredited (Peter). 
Even if the legal means are applied to settle the issue for the 
bankers, it does not necessarily lead to a satisfactory result. Not 
because the cost of implementing of sanction too high, but there is grey 
,area in laws so that creditors are put in a disadvantaged position. 
For example" a client export goods wi tl1 a LIC, discount or 
negotiate. He receives LIC, then the foreign bank or the 
foreign buyer refuses to pay, where is the recourse? Of 
course you may sue the bank 'or the buyer for if the 
documents comply with the -L/C terms, they have the 
obligation to pay. But in reality, to find fault with you is 
not difficult. Say, LIC will ' call for documents [that was 
issued by a third party, usualiy an arbiter, to ensure that 
the goods are ,exactly what the buyer have orderedl. Only on 
conditions that all documepts comply with the LIC terms that 
the issuing bank would pay. If one discrepancy found,the 
issuing bank ,can refuse to pay. But what is one discrepancy? 
It is very~asy to find for one comma missed in the address 
can be a di$crepancy. In real life, you can never know 
whether you can win "and you can only bring it to the court 
and let the court to_rule it out (Peter). 
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Even the sanctioning mechanism is devised, it may not work. To bring the 
case to court, it does not guar'antee the judgement is on the side of 
bankers. Furthermore, even the judgement is favorable to the bankers, it 
does not follow that they can obtain money. Bankers may also suffer 
great loss despi te wining the, case as there are still chances for the 
debtors to play tricks. 
We have sued a comp~ny and the judgement is on us. But it is 
a limi ted company. He dj ssolve the company at once and g'ave 
all machiriery~ computers etc. to ,his relatives (it must be 
the idea of solici tors! ). Wha't make us angry is that his 
rel~tives established another new company at exactly the 
same place and we can't do anything! (Helen) 
In the above discussion, we are only dealing with the cases that 
are explicitly violating the terms of lending. Sanction may not work. 
Even if it works, it may not be able to cover the losses which can cost 
the bank dearly. However, the fatal defect of sanction is that it only 
passively draws the boundary of action. It is like an electric fence 
that confines debtors' latitude of action. However, within the boundary, 
there are still rooms for the borrowers to engage in high risk trading 
. that violates the interest of bankers. One of the 'trick' is 'kite 
flying' , 
I know that some knItting factories do not actually have 
inventory, ' they make it up_ For example, A gives _B a bill, 
thirty days due and B gives another on'~ to A, twenty nine 
days due. B takes the bill to a bank and discounts it [B 
'sells' the bill to the bank in a discounted rate, 
thereafter, the banker is th~ creditor of Al. In a normal 
case, B will put money in the current account of A. Then the 
accoun~~f A can settle the bill to B. B makes use of the 
money from the discount to do \what he likes within that 
twenty nine days. In sum, A helped B. It . is an implicit way 
of lending. (Helen) 
There is utterly no transaction of goods and services in this case. It 
is B that makes use of 1) ' ~he money from the bank and 2) the trust of A. 
If every A, B, C, D, E can .put money in the current accounts just in 
time, there will be no problem at all. However, if B (for instances, the 
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one who get much 'helps' from friends} runs away, all his friends will 
be betrayed. The concerned bank )will call them to settle the loans. The 
above respondent said 'I met a case in which are ten drawers were put 
into water. I could only make six of them to pay back, the other four 
were ruined.' She also mentiqned that 'some people even make use of it 
to make money.' The point is, even within the legally accepted boundary, -
there are many 'risky behaviors' that banker do not like them to happen .. 
The tricks, in essence, are played wit~in the gap in of rules and 
regulations. In these situations, the possibility of sanction is utterly 
irrelevant. 
As the interviewees repeatedly put it 'we are in light, and they 
[the borrowers] are in dark' (f,."1t 0'1' gel)..~~) .. The bankers are seen 
through by the clients, but the former can only have some vague 
knowledge on the latter. If they cheat bankers wilfully, bankers have-
few protection. 
What is the gist of security? For borrowers, it is a possibility 
of sanction. For bankers, it is both a possibility of sanction and a 
tools to cover loss in case of the clients fail to repay. The bankers 
must request security, the conditions must be harsh enough to protect 
., 
their interests . . However, if one equates the risk of bankers with the 
money they lend out, the value of security, in general, will not largely 
exceed the risk taken. Security i~ only a means to counter balance risk, 
making risk bearable. 
CONCLUSION 
,. 
To sum up, for the interest of the bankers, they would like 
borrowers to rep~y rather than to take over security. Paradoxically, .to 
implement any coercive . measures on clients, for instance, to require . 
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them to repay ln schedule, the threat to take over security is the trump 
card. Wi thout that rights, bankers can never ,hope' to ha~e low bad debt 
rate. However, even so it should also be noted that whether the 
creditors' interest can be adequately upheld is doubtful. Possibility of 
sanction is a sword (with uncertain capacity) hanging over the clients' 
neck. Bankers do not like to use it, but withdrawing it is also 
impossible. It is exactly what the 'possibility of sanction'. It is not 
the coercive nature of sanction that makes one comply. It is the 
possibility of punishment that shapes the motivation of the two parties. 
How the 'possibility' is realized is another matter. ' 
We can now clearly see the relationship between familiarity and 
sanction. If familiarity is "to know what one wo~ld act in the future', 
sanction is negatively 'to know what one would not act in the future'. 
The latter alone is far from enough for it can at best deter deliberate 
faul t but there are inst'ances that the borrowers are facing formidable 
environmental force that they plainly ' lose all the capacity to repay. 
The case will be more complicated if clients cheat. Possibility of 
sanction alone cannot help a bank make profit. Banks are not pawn shop, 
they make profit on interest rather than selling security. As a lending 
related staff vividly expressed: 
Don't think that you put ten millions in our bank then we 
will offer facilities. Who knows where the money comes from? 
Who knows what is your background? (Yeun~) 
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CHAPTER 4 






In the last chapter; we have much discussion on the possibility of 
sanction. The possibility of sanction is an indispensable part of 
lending. Paradoxically, it is very undesirable for bankers to be 
explicit about this possibility. Moreover banks profit from repayment 
rather than taking over property. Before the lending decision is made, 
they should know whether the clients will repay. They should have the 
ability to foresee who will repay and who will not. ~vhile it is 
impossible for anyone to foresee the future, one could fill the gap by 
trust. In trusting, however, 1 bankers are not blindly believing that the 
clients act on their good faith. They have a base to trust: familiarity. 
-One cannot trust under chaos, a first step to trust is to be 
familiar your counterpart. As I mentioned before, familiarity is only 
the preconditibn of tiust. It is not trust itself. Familiarity yields 
distrust too. However, to trust and distrust somebody, one has to be 
familiar with him first~ 
In this chapter, the reader ~ill learn how bankers get familiar 
wi th clients ~ _ To get familiar wi th someone, is not easy. Special devices 
---are used by bankers. The tools themselves, however, may find certain 
clients difficult 'to be trustworthy'. While bankers find them not 
'trustworthy', these pot~ntial · clients are avoided. 
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I. ON FAMILIARITY 
To be familiar wi th something involves, several issues. Firstly, 
what are the means adopted and through what channels borrowers' 
information flow to the bank? Clients, with respect to the bank, are 
unknown entities. Bankers, are not interested in all the details of . . 
. clients but only the aspects that they find relevant. Given bankers 
constraints, they use only a few tools to get familiar with clients. 
Those who fails to present themselves through these channels will be in 
a disadvantageoug position. The means to be familiar with clients are 
indeed important. 
The second issue is, what are the qualities that bankers looking 
for? To be familiar with someone is only the process to get to know 
clients. After all, not all familiar persons are trustworthy. What are 
the specific_good qualities bankers like? 
The third issue is, what aspects of clients bankers need to be 
familiar with. To ensure that borrowers will repay, the central concern 
of bankers is that clients will not cheat. Some clients may deliberately 
deceive the bankers, or play tricks within the boundary of the law. If 
clients are found to be doing so, b~nkers will not accommodate them. The 
second conce.rn of . bankers ·. is the repayment' ablli ty •. · Bankers are anxious 
to keep an eye on clients' financial conditions so as to see whether 
they are involved in any form of d~fficulties. It is because a prudent . 
and honest businessman may still run a . very bad company. 
How many aspects the bankers needed to .be familiar with the 
clients? Following the above logic, there are three. Firstly, it is the 
individual level. It concerns 'with the personality and management style 
of the industrialists. Th~ second aspect is the firm level. It is 
because although someone is prudent, his firm may not be able to 
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generate sufficient profits to repay. One have to know how the firm 
works before one lends out. The third aspect is the industry the client 
is engaged in. A good firm may be brought down bya declining trade. In 
other words, a downward going industry may increase the risk of lenders, 
no matter how good the curreh~ standing of an individual firm. These 
three aspects are not separate categories. As we know, good management 
can turn a dying firm aroSe. A robust establishment can probably still 
make profit even under a unsound leadership. Although the three levels 
are interrelated; the distinction is still useful because conceptually 
this division can help clarify the various expectations of bankers 
toward the clients. A more salient theoretical 'concern here is that 
lending decision is not based only on information of one level only. 
Even when someone has very good relation with banks (in Granovetter's 
term, this maybe the network resources. In Zucker's, this is process 
based trust), to protect their own interest, bankers will still look for 
further information of the firm as well as the macro trends. Bankers, 
-
like sociologists, see things in a rather comprehensive way and they are 
concerned with the individual level, firm level and macro levelI . 
A. The Individual Aspect 
What are the ' qualities of a good borrower? Experiences and 
prudence. For loans used for business purposes, bankers will only lend 
to those who.already have many years of experiences in that industry. 
Moreover, bankers will lend only to : those who will not cheat. This is 
annoying enough. How- can a banker know how experienced a client is? And 
how can one know who will deliberately cheat the banker and who are 
IMacro level is in a very general sense here. What it refers to depends on what 
the problem is at hand. In general, it is the effects of the wider political and 
economic context on a specific industry. 
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To be familiar with the cl{ent is thus .the most ' difficult task. It 
IS not because human being is essentially difficult to be understood, 
but that there are few clear cut indicators to show the trustworthiness 
of clients. It is difficult to check the 'prudence' of clients (Peter). 
Some lending managers found it the most important variable in any 
lending decision as a prudent partner gives much convenience in dealing 
(Peter). Although others find it not accurate as a measure, it does have 
some weight. ' 
Of course we cannot judge a man by his look. Gut feeling is 
not a good indicator. However, in some cases, for instance, 
for unsecured lending, it is quite an important factor. ' 
Surely, we don't rely solely on ' it. For example if I find 
him in a bad manner, having sneaky eyes, it definitely 
discounts my trust toward him. If he fails to provide sound 
supporting materials, he cannot hope to obtain anything from 
me (David). 
Another respondent also found it important but he admitt~d that it 
was not easy to spell out what are the crfteria of prudence were for it 
involved many subtle gives and takes of interaction. 'One has to rely on 
dialogue and probing to get an impression' (Peter). What is involved is 
something rather ethnomethodological. It is difficult to further 
delineate it. It is the r~alm of e~periences and wisdom rather than ' ~ 
positive knowledge. A banker told me: 
i' In the first ten minutes of interaction,. a good front line 
marketing officer should have some idea about the client 
(David). 
The other method to check a c~ient is to cross reference with his 
fellow businessmen and with others who are in the same industry. This 
method usually works because ~ost of the clients are introduced by 
existing clients. They may be partners or subsidiaries of the existing 
clients. In these cases, information on both the personal conduct and 
managing experiences can be cross checked. Moreover, some marketing 
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managers who have many connections with all walks of life can make use 
of their network resources to check the details of a new client. It is a 
very important information source. If , there is no previous dealing, 
~ocial network is the only sources of information that h~lps bankers to 
be familiar with a client (As credit information agency cannot provide 
these data. It will be discussed later). Without these sources the' new 
client will be a complete stranger. That is why walk-in clients are very 
difficult to handle. It is because bankers do not have any background 
information on these complete strangers. They do not know actually how . 
' ''' I' 
they behave. This self presentation is a matter of doubt too. In such 
cases, some bankers just ignore them unless they have excellent 
standings. 
We handle few walk-in clients. As the walk-ins are usually 
small stuff, using their old .apartment as security and 
asking for only about half a million dollars [too little]. 
Such petty clients don't worth so much paper work. (Helen') 
. For those who are in the same 'community, they share information 
with each other so that familiarit~ is relatively easy to achieve (what 
Zucker termed characteristics based trust). It facilitates further 
cooperation. ,It is conceivable that not only membership in the same 
business community matters, those who share the same ethnicity and clan 
can also be an asset in lending since they ~hare the samedriginwhich 
makes informational flow easier. In the transaction, the role of gb 
between is important in shortening various social distances. 
However; the weight of conneption should not be exaggerated. Even 
a referral from existing clients is not a guarantee of success. ·. 
Referral is both good and' bad. Referral mostly comes from 
familiar clients. They .may be friends, or fellow 
businessmen. You have more confidence. Anyway you have to 
check the ·-financial and track records. I met a man, referred 
my an existing client. I did not lend him anything for his 
financial record ' is really bad. (Peter) 
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In other instances, he mentioned that 
A client ran into trouble. He needed our help. Well, he was 
an old client of us and he had been a good client. We had at 
least thirty years experiences Qf corporation. We turned it 
down anyway. He sighed that "Well, thirty years, thirty 
years of corporation means nothing". But the point is, we 
can't take that risk. The 'fact is that he was dying and 
thirty years don't mean .everything. (Peter) 
Thus, a prudent banker considers not only prudence and experience, but 
also many other aspects to make a deal successful. Given a firm is 
robust enough, referrals may help the entrepreneur to access banks. For 
the unsound firmi, it does not help. 
Familiarity can also be artificially developed. A lending manager 
claimed that buying dinner for others ' wasals6 /a means to increase 
familiarity. 
We will not hold that kind of feast [as the Chinese bankers 
doJ ... We have our VIP dining room for the really big 
clients. For · the-firstsuccessful dealing, say, the first 
dealing of a cold-called client, I will din with him. It is 
a very important way t io keep the retationship. Indeed, in 
the business community, dining is a common practice to show 
your appreciation of the relationship .. Of course we will not 
dine with the very small manufacturer ... lt is not only 
social gathering, it is to get familiar with clients from 
various dimensions (Peter) . . 
Apart fr.om these '-informal practices, there are credi t information 
agencies that provide information. on the trustworthiness of the 
population. They do sq .by sending messengers :to all the courts to record 
all count cases, the people involved (the defendant of course) and their 
personal particulars. A huge data base is built so that virtually all 
men who have been sued or running into bankruptcy can be easily checked 
just by clicking in an identity card number. 'They can hardly get any 
money from the bank!' (David) 
To sum.·up, to get t.o know an individual, bankers can only rely on 
information from exist'ing .networks and their own perception. Those 
clients having connection will be in upper hand. Moreover, ethnicity, and 
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kinship can also be useful for there -are forms of network resources too. 
B. The Firm Level 
The second aspect bankers investigate is the firm. It is a very 
important aspect because loan~ are principally used in the firms rather 
than by the entrepreneurs himself (that will be malfeasance if the 
latter happens). It is the profit generated from firms that covers the 
bank loans. In the textbook version of ,lending, it is the firm that 
counted most. The- performance of a firm is crucial. 
What bankers look for is good performance. In the textbook case, 
having ten percent of net annual profit margin "is desirable. In reality, 
up to five percent is good enough and there are firms having even more 
slimmer margins. It is difficult to tell how much net earning is enough. 
So, to borrow money, firms must first make net profit. Firms keeping on 
losing money must not be accommodated. For existing clients, bankers are 
highly 'cautious of the standing of the firm. I f there are signs of 
difficulties, the bank will immediately re-evaluate the situation. 
How to become familiar with an establishment? In this aspect, the 
more institutionalized measures are used. There are various channels 
providing information on the borrowers' firms. However, ' the 
uninstitutionalized method is also important. 
As Zucker rightfully put it, for the frequent long distance 
transaction, trust producing institutions are very important. They make 
economic transaction possible for those who do not have previous 
encounters with each' other. There are some neutral information agencies 
that are publicly recognized as honest and disinterested. According to 
Hong Kong company law, limited companies are required to produce audited ' 
financial statement every year. It is the most trustworthy document in . 
90 
traditional lending for it is supposed to be auth~ntic. In reality, the 
data for preparing audit .statement are provided by the firms. Although 
auditors will use various supplementary references for cross checking, 
fpr tax purposes it is not infrequent that the audit statement is 
defective. 'Good performance is turned into bad and vice versa' 
(Rowena). In effect, bankers will request all financial statements and 
bank statements of the last three years to account for the performance 
of clients. Even if the firms have no formal financial statements, 
b~nkers coulJ still manage with bank statements since they can tell a 
lot of things. A fatal difficulty is that a firm do not have any 
institutionalized accounting system so that the bank cannotevaltiate its 
standing. For some bankers, the case can still be handled but with some 
suspicion. For some others, 
I find that this sort of factories [the small ' factories] 
have difficulty to get money. For they do not have -well 
formulated au~it statement. They are mostly sole 
proprietors. In the law, they are not required to produce 
'audit report. I met some clients who even had no decent 
statements to the Inland Revenue. How can I trust them!' 
(Helen) 
One more way is to check the account conduct. If borrowers have 
current accounts in the bank, the bank may check whether there are cases 
of dishonored checks and how active the account is. It provides onli a 
very gene~al impression. However, if dishono~ed ' checks are frequent, 
bankers will reluctant to lend. 
Another means of examination is to request the inter bank credit 
report. The banking community has 'developed a cross checking measure to 
find information of. borrowers. If a borrower has more than one banker, 
then the new banker can make use of this channel to check the client's 
activities in other banks. It is a mutually beneficial measure. In 
principle it Joins the efforts of 'bankers to cross reference problematic 
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borrowers. However, a deficiency is that is too brief~ 'It gives 
information like whether the account is active, and in general how the 
client manages his account etc' (Ho).Te' be brief is a normal practice. 
It is inevitable because it involves disclosing the information of a 
. 1 
third party. Although the issuing bank is exempted from legal 
responsibility i.e. it d~es not violate the banking law, but the banks 
still refrain from reporting the details so as to- -avoid any possIble 
blame. Nevertheless, 'If it is a really bad client, bankers can sense 
it' (Peter). Unf~~tunately, some interviewees said that inter bank 
report could also be a means of malfeasance for the issuing banks." There 
were instances that the issuing banks produced inaccurate reports to 
make other bankers take over a bad client. The issuing bank could not be 
blamed since some words used in the report are ambiguous (Rowena). 
--
Making a firm visit is another wa~ to investigate a firm. 
Normally, lender will visit the client's firm at least once a year. The 
frequency depends on the bank's pol-icy and the client's -situation. 
Usually, it is the marketing team who does it. The marketing officers 
may check wh~ther the ~tocks are old and worn out, how the men work, 
whether the factories are actually running, and even 'is there really 
such a firm existing· ' .(Raymond). They can only manage to generate a very 
general impression of the firms standing. · In-depth investigation is not 
possible. 'It is hopeless to require bankers to know much about 
production. To visit is to learn' \ (Peter). Although the visitors may not 
obtain much concrete information, the impression is useful. Mor~over, 




, . l 
c. The Wider Environment 
The third level is to be familiar with the industry in which the 
clients are engaged in. There are two setises in this aspect. The first 
orte is to know the practices of the industry. As a marketing officer 
said, 
Some may thin that a client is in difficulty for he ~ k~eps on 
exceeding OD cap, fails to settle loans. But it mainot be 
the case. It may due to the seasonal fluctuation of" that 
b~siness br some special production manage~ent. One fails to 
grasp it may risk losing good client. (Helen) 
" , 
, , 
Moreover, as she " 61~imed, some industries are riotorious of malfeasance. ' 
After describing the kite flying (see chapter 3), she added 'knitting 
factory, as I have heard, have many scandal like ' this." (tIelen) 
Another sense is the future prospects of the industry. In general~ 
bankers are reluctant to lend to sunset industries. One marketing 
officer said 
If you are doing fur business, I will not give you any 
money. Owing to the environmental protectionism, fur 
factory is in the lowest tide. The market in generalis very 
bad, no matter in Hong Kong, Europe and or the North 
America. I cannot see any firm can make it. Even the robust 
firm, we would handle it in a cautious approach. (Peter) 
When the banks -check a ffrm, they will put it in a larger perspective to 
see how worth it is. Firms in declining industry are risky for no matter 
how robust they are in the present moment, the !risk of falling down is 
particularly high. It takes much more effort in mbnitoring and bankers 
are in constant fear of its collapse. Some ,bankers ,said that they would 
. accept only the outstanding firms (Rowena) but not nel'l clients unless 
I 
they were highly profitable. Some even actually 'close the umbrella' 
i.e. fade out of the market (David). Not to mention accepting new 
client, they may eyen require existing clients to pay back in schedulei 
Apart from the perfo~mance of the industry as a whole, bankers 




Favorite Nation granted to China by the United States and the 
protectionist Bill 301. No matter how strong ,the firms are, when facing 
these formidable forces the firms cannot survive for long. For example, 
it a ne~ ban is implemented, for the concerned trade, sixty percent of 
orders to the America mightyanish. The bankers are seasonally 
frightened by those debates. Also, issues like insurgency, enforcing new -
foreign exchange control; will increase the country risk and they make 
lenders more cautious. 
To sum up, - bankers are involved in an inherently risky trade. The 
nature of the business requires them t6 predict how one will act in the 
future. Nevertheless, no exhaustive prediction is possible in real life. 
To make money on lending they should thus achieve a high level of 
familiarity with their clients, i.e. the entrepreneur, the firm and the 
industry.-For those who fail to get familiar with bankers, no matter it 
is the bankers failing to know the clients (e.g. they lack the expertise 
to do so), or the clients fail to be acknowledged by the bankers (they 
-
do not have the 'devices to let banker get informed), bankers will find 
them unfamiliar and thus the decision to lend becomes uncertain. A 
crispy solution for the bankers is to refrain from action - lending no 
money to that business. 
Here, it presumes that once a higher level of familiarity is 
achieved, latitude of action increases. A concrete action is to lend 
more. For firs~_dealings, both the bankers and clients are tentative. 
Once the relation is built up, borrowers enjoy many advantages. Firstly, 
they may enjoy express services. It is because they are already i'amiliar 
from the bankers' point of view,. The routinized procedures can be easier-
to handle. Moreov~r, t~ey: may have various benefits like less handling 
charges and better bargains with the solicitors. The most ' valued benefit 
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is the approval of clean loan. As the relation has been established, the 
clean -portion can be higher. It is because when 6ne's status is 
familiar, his future actions are supposed to be predictable and the 
weight of sanction decreases. 
It should riot be mistak~n that familiarity implies trust. 
Familiarity, as mentioned before, is the base of trust as well as 
distrust. Once a client becomes familiar to a banker, the latter may 
choose to distrust if .the clients fail to the banker's expectation. For 
example, a client ,~ay be found reckless or running a very bad company, 
or engaged in a down turning trade. Banks will refuse all borrowing from 
the very beginning if the clients cannot meet their requirement. Clients .' 
are subjected to constant monitoring. Apart from the annual renewal of 
credit proposal, bankers are constantly keeping an eye on account 
conduct of clients. If the occurrenc~ 'of irregularities is found to be -
abnormally high,i.e. fail to settle trading financing credit on time, 
to exceed the OD cap frequently etc., bankers will contact the concerned 
clients to check the details. Moreover, marketing officers are highly 
sensitive to any insider talks on various walks of life. Any rumor will 
spur them to conduct- an interview with borrowers. Once bankers know that 
a client is in trouble, the first step they t~ke is to see what had 
happened. If any real problems are detected, they may 'close the 
umbrella' or 'kill' him. 
Close the-.umbrella' - me~ns fading out. The first step is to 
make a tighter and more formaL control. In short, strictly 
uphold the regulations is in itself a means of control. In 
renewal, we cut the facilities further. As far as I know, 
some US banks, the First Pacific for instances, will 'kill' 
the client at once - to call back the loan. We won't do 
that, not for mercy but as my manager have- said, if you kill 
him at once, you may ' not even get back you share for you may 
really force", him to die. If that is the case how can we get 
back the outstanding 'ODs? Even there is security in our 
hand, to resort to legality is troublesome. Furthermore, 
they usually have more than one creditors, it makes the 
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procedure very complicated. So we will rather ,hang it on. 
Moreover, killing it at 'once means throwing the hot pot to 
other banks. To call back loans will ~orce him to squeeze 
money from other bankers. 
However, there exists ~ risk that everyone kills him, 
no one can get back anything. We handled a case that we 
-notified a client who had been killed by another banker, but 
it was too late for us to do so for it would ruin him and we 
would get nothing, we could 'only steadily close the 
umbrella. (Helen) 
They will not pour in new facilities to save firms at stake (even 
the old cli~nts) unless a very sound rescue plan is proposed (Raymond). 
From the bankers' eyes, few dying firm can revive (Yeung). Putting in 
" ":i' 
more resources can only prolong its life for a moment. Some bankers even 
will not lend to firms that are engaged in declining industry. For the 
clients, the bank may even call back loans (David). 
In general, bankers are highly reluctant to lend to firms in 
trouble. From their point of view; not to call back loans i~ , ~erciful, 
making new loans is impossible. For the declining industry, some bankers 
lend to the market leaders only. Some abandon clients in such industry 
and try exploring another market. -
Is it accurate to say that' bankers do not want to take risk? It is , 
not the case because their business is already a risky one, they only 
want to alleviate the risk. 
11. THE UNFAMILIAR ENVIRONMENTS 
To trust, one needs to be familiar< with something. Familiarity, 
however, presupposes an affinity "with stability~ New environment and 
chaotic environment are difficult to make sense of, thus need much 
additional efforts to handle •. , Moreover, the system (in our context, the 
bank) is inherep.tly limited in making sense of the ' environment. Our ' 
respondents are bankers only. They cannot hope to hav~ the expert 
-knowledge as their' clients do. The most familiar environment for them 
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should be the banks! For the changes in the clients or the environment, 
new elements and instability may result, which, will further alleviate 
banker's uncertainty. Luhmann's remark is insightful: 'The objective 
world is more complex than any system, it comprises of much more 
possibilities that the system ,itself provides for and can realize.' 
(Luhmann 1979:32) In the following, the unfamiliar environment bankers 
find it difficult to handle will be discussed. 
-
A. Unfamiliar Situations 
Dealing with new clients are more risky than with the old. In 
these cases when there is no previous dealing ~ecord,the bankers are 
subjected to higher uncertainty. Usually, new clients will be required 
to submit full financial statements, related data, and all loans should 
b~ fully secured. After a period of satisfactory corporation, 
relationship can be built up and a strong~r bonding can be developed. 
Then loans can be clean out and scrutiny can be more slack. 
To lend to new establishments is a big difficulty. First of , all, 
banks will not lend money to help clients setting up bland new 
establishments. That is, banks will never lend to start up business for 
this ' involves too high a risk. 'It is the job of venture capital rather ' 
than the bank.' (Ho) Moreover, newly established firms, asking for loans 
will face great difficulties because there is no track record to be 
referred to. I.n these cases, bankers (so do the borrowers) have nothing 
in hand to see how the firms work in the past., not to say in the future. 
Here, bankers are subjected to a very low level of familiarity. Even if 
they are willing' to lend, they ·will adopt a very cautious approach. They' 
will 'do la11 the'. researches, ask for ' alL information, make all efforts, 
and check whether the case fits the bank's strategy' (David). A 
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personnel In a major Hong Kong bank claimed that in practice, they would 
not accommodate firms with less than three /years of age (Peter). 
It is also uneasy for bankers to .handle pioneering and high 
technological level products. All the interviewees in this study 
admitted that they had no expert knowledge on high end products. They 
have no specialized department to keep pace with the technological 
development. Most of the banks offer only general statistical data for 
reference but it is useful only for chattering. Even the banks with 
specialized divIsion for economic research, the data give little direct 
usage on lending (Peter). Moreover, all of the interviewees are supposed 
to have no previous knowledge on technology, Except three of them,their 
undergraduate subjects are mostly business administration and other 
related subjects. The remaining three studied economic, history and 
soci_ology respecti vely . Their knowledge on production comes from _talks 
with clients and their own common sense. Although bankers may not need 
to know the bolts and nuts of it, lacking knowledge of it will make them 
more alert and suspicious . 
A report prepared by a private agency and sponsored by the 
Productiviti Council confirms this point (Survey Research Inc. 1986)~ 
The report reyeals that the inability of the plastic industrialists"to 
upgrade industrial design is partly the result of lacking finance. The 
interest rate of industrial loans is high. What is more, in many 
instances, banks do not have the capabilities to properly evaluate .the 
risks for industrial loans or ju~t shy away from them entirely (Survey 
Research Inc. 1986:87). The report further uncovers that bankers' 
understanding of manufacturing business in general was poor. It is 
certain~y a . barrier to lend. A case of a foreign bank interviewed in the 
report is indicative: 
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[there] is the situation, of a foreign bank in H~ng Kong, 
where lending officers are all experienced, having work 
previously for various local banks in similar capacities. 
This foreign bank has hired an outside organization to train 
their lending officers on evaluat{ng industrial loan 
applications and risks. In their previous capacities, these . 
lending officers were discouraged from making these loans in 
preference to real ' estate and commercial loans and were not 
trained to evaluate them. (Survey Research Inc. 1986:100) 
The report concludes tha~ only the top industrial firms can obtain funds 
from bank to invest in new technologies, advanced equipment, and higher 
value added product development, 'and not always to them either' (Survey 
Research Inc. 19~~:100). 
A banker, however, insisted that the HSBC (he was the Assistant 
General Manager of HSBC) had well over a hundred years of experiences in 
lending. It also makes effort to construct flexible loan packages to 
suit the needs of customers (HKIN 1986:100). In an other instance he 
said that bankers In Hong Kong had became experts in financing Hong 
Kong's manufacturers and exports. Close links have been established and 
give bankers an in-depth understanding of the manufacturing and 
exporting business. Bankers were said to respond quickly 'and even 
imaginatively' to the ' needs of their customers (HKIN 1987). 
Nevertheless, he ~ admi tted ' w~ are not manufacturers, we are bankers. \' 
(HKIN1985:100) Another banker opined that each trade had its own 
operational characteristics and different trades had different potential 
for development. It is very difficult for a single bank to be thoroughly 
knowledgeable " on the characteristics of all trades. 'Since bankers know 
more about traditional manufacturing industries, it is easier tq provide 
loans for such trade. However, there are always limitations on what a 
banker can do' (Business Journa.l 1986:13). For him, one solution is to 
improve communication between bankers and manufacturers. 
Is it impossible to recruit professionals to estimate the 
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riskiness of new production technology? Probably it is not particularly 
useful for the banks dealing with a diversified market. One or two 
knowledgeable staffs may not be able to tackle the whole variety of the r 
field. Bear in mind that detail works need more supervision and affects 
the banks overhead toa great extent (HKPN 1984). Hence even the 
American banks mentioned above, they are only hiring external agency to 
train up credit officers. 
A further difficulty faced by industries that manufacturing high 
tech products is that the market fluctuates so much and their products 
switch so fast. A new product may be downgraded and loses the market 
share within half a year. For industries engaging in these production, 
bankers find them risky. ' 
I had a client doing something with computer. It worked 
well, so far so good. No obvious signs of difficulties were 
detected. But things changed fast. In recent month, they had 
been failing to repay T/R. The situation ran worse, they 
were on the eve of bankruptcy ... Then the Japanese ,[the , 
superior] warned that we should try not to engage in high 
tech business for it was too ' risky. (Ho) 
Here, we should not ignore possible mismanagement in that case but 
the rapid oscillation 'of product market also matters. 
Bankers are also weary of pioneering products. To them they a~e 
uncertain. Som'e .lending officers express th'eir impotence on pioneering 
products. 
A client asked money for developing a product. It was 
somethi~g that helped one to do exercise on the bed. He 
brought along , wi th his new "'product and various photos to 
persuade us. We turned it down anyway ' for we didn't actually 
have much knowledge on it. We could only manage to resort ' to 
guessing and asked ourselves: "would we buy it if we see it 
in departmental store?t~ I agree· that we may not have the 
knowledge to handle it. ' (Ho) 
Expansion".is also a new form- of uncertainty. Clients' borrowing 
money for expansion mean~ , that they need to explore a new market, or a 
larger market share. Internally, clients are stretching their- own 
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resources and capability. Externally, they are exploring the new 
possibilities of the market. Both of these sides are not previously 
accustomed by the banker, though they ~ay have some knowledge of it. A . 
middle level officer sa{d 'there is no major difficulty in principle. A 
firm try to expand itself is reasonable enough' but 
To expand the industry should have a good prospect. Clients 
should have the market, the labor and the personnel. In 
fact, ·for some products like computer, one generation means 
one year, you cannot pump in too much money to manufacture 
it a year later. No one may buy your product! (David) 
Apart from the problem of marketing, one particular problem for · 
small industrialists is that current good performance may not be 
sustained when it expands. It is because the small entrepreneurs running 
business cannot be guaranteed to make the change successful when it 
grows to a size which demands professional management. As most of the 
manufacturing businesses are small, it causes unpredictability to the 
bankers (HKPN 1984). 
For expansion, prosperity and management capacity will be needed 
to invite bankers' involvement. As an interviewee said, 'to ask 
addi tional facili ties ·, one should have outstanding performance' (Peter). 
- As mentioned before, bankers are- supposed to have less knowledge on 
specific trade than their borrowers. 
There are also cases that the two sides have different perceptions 
on a deal, making it difficult to fulfill the needs of borrowers 
unfulfilled. - ~ case reported by ~KINvividly shows the incongruent 
perspectives of bankers and manufacturers. -For textile manufacturers to 
export the listed products to , the United States (and also some Western 
countries that set a quote on those products), they have to acquire 
textile . quotas owing to the special import arrangements imposed by those 
countries. For industrialists that aiming at, for example, the United 
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States market, quota is the crucial 'asset' for prod~ction. Quota to 
textile people always comes before any other tangible assets such as 
premises and machines. Unless they do n6t export to the United States, 
they should acquire the quotas before they produce (for more details on 
the system, see HSBC 1977). A good strategy for them is to buy permanent 
quotas from the large firms so that they can permanently produce and 
export textile goods with that quotas. 
For bankers, credit for buying quota is generally regarded as the 
loans for applicant's current expenses rather than a fixed asset. An 'on 
going situation is that many of the small or medium textile factories 
with proven records of good performance have little chance of obtaining 
support from banks to purchase permanent quotas. Even for those firms 
with good reputation, as the HSBC, only term loans that are repayable in 
two to three years could be made. The small industrial loans which the 
HSBC ,and the Bank of China offered may also be helpful. However, for 
both of the two channels, the period is too short and the amount is too 
small (HKIN 1985). The bankers cannot adequately serve clients in that 
case. 
B., Loans Products and Familiarity 
We have discussed how , to spot good borrowers and what kind of 
request is welcomed. It is interesting that the various credit products 
are also disparate in their riskiness. The cash line products, for 
example, OD and term loans are more risky than the trade line ' e~g. L/C. 
For' the cash line, in princi~le the purposes of the loans are known but 
in practice, bankers cannot-- control how one makes use of their OD. It is 
not impossible that clients draw all OD then run away. Although bankers 
have security at hand, it is still dangerous as the implementation of 
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sanction is clumsy. The trade line is supposed to be more comfortable 
for bankers. First of all, there is a known and specified purpose of 
finance thus the risk of 'run away' is . minimized. For some trade line 
products, likeL/C, banks have the ownerships of the goods until the 
loans are settled. It is thus doubly secured i.e. the security pledged 
to the bank plus the goods as security. Banks are in a bettei position 
in principle. The additional benefit of the trade line is that apart 
from the interest, banks receive handling charges for every deal. Trade 
line products 'usually involve foreign exchange and banks can make money 
on these exchanges. Trade line is the category that bankers -like most. 
Among the various loans products, loans flow to machinery products 
i.e. hire purchasing, are highly risky. For this form of financing, the 
machinery acquired by industrialists should be pledged to bank in the 
. -
form of debenture. Although the ~achinery is legally the security in 
bankers' hand, in reality, this right -is very difficult to materialize. 
Even we ignore the possibility t~at the- borrowers may move the machinery 
to an unknown place (it is highly possible) so that bankers cannot take 
the title of it, depreciation and downgrading are very fast for 
machinery. After two years of 6~eration, the market value of the 
security may drop to zero. To buy machiner~ for a.factory in mainland 
China is further complicated since a bank .in Hong Kong cannot take the 
title of it in any meaningfu~ ~ense. What is more, once the machines are 
moved to mainland, it cannot be brought back to Hong Kong again. A 
respondent said that to make 'hire purchas-ing loan was very difficul t 
and only the best clients could use this product' (Yeung). A middle 
level staff even said, 'we virtually count it as clean loans.' It is 
conceivable that without security as possible sanctioning measure, a 
very high level of familiarity' is needed (David). 
103 
c. Who are More Daring to Lend? 
We have said a lot about lending. We are concerned mainly with how 
banks rank clients and the related me~sures. Are all the banksadoptirig 
the same approach? An interesting query here is, who are more da~ingto , 
lend? As I observed, virtually all banks follow the same principles and 
the procedures are also similar. Some banks, however, are said to be 
more adventurous, and crude. The American banking houses fall into this 
category. Several respondents (Rowena, Helen, Raymond, and 10) told me 
the same storj~ David, a middle level manager of a leading American 
bank, denied that they were adventurous. However, iri the interview, it 
was found that his bank would involve in the supposedly more risky 
trading. For example, they accept requests from new establishments, 
actively explore new market, lend daringly to pioneering products and 
, -
services, and make large clean portion. Other interviewees are typically 
reluctant to handle these cases. Nonetheless, astonishing enough, the 
American bankers are crude. For instances, in handling their clients, 
they call back loan in schedule (it can be disastrous to a firm) just 
because of the industry at large declined {not the firm}. They 'kill' 
clients at once if signs of difficulties are detected. They try nat to 
handle clients that ,are away from their strategy, e.g. manufacturing 
industry. It is thus difficult to say whether they are adventurous or 
cons~rvative. When seeing an opportunity, they do it in full string. 
When traits' -of difficulty detected they totally withdraw at once. 
Here, it is tentatively suggested that this is not cont~adictory 
and it can be also understood with the concept of trust. Apparent, the 
American bankers spends a lot of effort in credit' information and the 
interviewee emphasized much on .how to use various means to cross 
checking a borrower. Looking at a new product, they will . actually do 
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some vigorous studies on it and may even personally acquire some of the 
related technical know how. From the Survey Research Inc. research cited 
above (Survey ' Research Inc. 1986:100), some American banks may eyen 
employ external resources to train up lending mana~e-rs to evaluate 
riskiness of specific trade. It is also reported in another paper that 
the lending teams are subdivided into small teams specializing in 
different trades. This enables them to accumulate knowledge (HKIN 
1985:5). It seems that they actively and even aggressively acquire a 
high level of ''familiarity and thus their latitude of action is wide. The 
respondent (David) is proud of his exposure to various walks of life so 
that his clients are inclined to get his advice. This manoeuvre makes 
them sensitive to the new possibilities as well as decline of specific 
trade. Quick response is possibl~. Facing complicated environment, not 
all banks will respond with the same attitude. Some may plays safe while 
some may make a great leap. Inspired by Luhmann we can say that banks 
which have the resources to acquire high level of familiarity can be 
more ready to trust and hence their latitude of action is larger 
(Luhmann 1979:80). 
CONCLUSION 
To sum up, for those who succeeded in borrowing money, they are 
likely to be well established (with a sound track record), engaging in a 
prosperous' trade and having a considerable asset {for security) and a . 
good reputation within the business community. In this game~ the one who 
can make use of the bank loan should be the one who are already having a 
good standing. The reputation and assets do not only make the current 
succes1s possible, but also makes available the various resources that 
propel future growth. For the 'underprivileged' they are trapped in a 
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vicious cycle of poverty. 
This should not be simply seen as the bankers' fault. Lending is a 
business that inherently involves predictions of the future. Trust is , a 
crucial ~lement in leriding. To build trust, bankers will devise 
sanctioning mechanism as well as acquiring familiarity with clients. To 
protect their interest, their conservatism is not unreasonable. 
As bank is so ~isk adverse, a banker made a joke that 'the best 
borrowers should be the supermarket. I mean only the two giants in Hong 
Kong. They provide the basic necessities with low demand elasticiti. All 
characters of a good borrower can be found there. There are many good 
business in the world, but not all are worthy of bank support.' (David) 
Let me use an insightful remark from him to conclude this chapter: 
From the bottom of my heart, I would rather make mistake 
like .this [not lending td a firm which turns out to be 
highly profitable] than the other way round. We should admit 
that the judgemerit is differen~. We have different 
interpretation of the situations. I know that I may carry ' 
many subjective elements here. Anyway, I that find it is 
bad, and my act follows my perception. That is all I can do, 
it is very subjective indeed. (David) 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE CREDIT WORTHINESS OF HONG KONG INDUSTRY 
After .explicating the 'method' and 'calculation' that bankers used 
in the lending protess, we can proceed in this chapter to investigate 
the probability of the manufacturers to receive bank financing. Firstly, 
the industrial structure in Hong Kong will be discussed especially 
~het~er the standing of Hong Kong manrifacturers can meet the criteria of 
bankers. It is found that the bulk of small to medium size factories are 
disadvantaged in borrowing money from the formal channel. The role of 
bank financing in early stages of Hong Kong Inaustrialization also 
merits a special treatment. It is said that the local bankers gave a 
helping hand to the early post war industrialization. If we find bankers 
having difficulties in lending to manufacturers, this historical 
experience needs some additional explanations. 
I. THE STANDING OF MANUFACTURERS 
The Hong Kong manufacturing sector is composed of a multitude of 
small and medium-sized factories. The data shows that in 1988, the firms 
that employed less than nine persons contribute to about 70% of the 
total number of firm. If we consider firms that firms employing less 
than forty nine persons small, then up to 95% of the firms are small 
(Table 5.1). Moreover, the proportion of the small firms is increasing'. 
j 
Overall speaklng, size (averag~· number persons engaged) of the Hong Kong 
factories is shrinking steadily. Some find that it is the idiosyncratic 
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Table 5.1 
Percentage Distribution of Reporting Hanufacturing Establish.ments, 
Analysis by AVErage NlJm~,r of Persons Engaged 
1 to t 
la to 19 
20 to <4, 
SO to 99 
100 to 199 
200 10 499 
500 to '99 





100 to 199 
200 10 499 
500 to 999 
I ~.nd ov., 
I '0 , 
la to 19 
20 '0 49 
50'099 
100 10 199 
:00 10"" 
500 la 999 
I 000 .nd ov.r 
Numbe, 0' hl"bll,hmenl. 
1978 197' 1980 1981 1982 
151.59% 82.93% 153 .08% 152.54% 114.915% 
115 .93% 15.32% 15.22% 18.00':4 15.17% 
12.17% 12.28% 12 ."5% 12.98% 11.79% 
5.20% 5 .38% 5.215':4 4.83",4 4.58% 
2.45% 2."3% 2.43% 2.17% 2.12% 
1. 17% 1.21% 1.15% 1.03':4 0 .95% 
0.35% 0.31% 0.29% 0.25-,4 0 . 215% 
0.13% 0.13% 0.11% 0.10% 0.09% 
, 
1978 197!J 1980 1981 1982 
10.95% 11.29% 11.99% 11.57% 12.17% 
9.815% 9.15% 9.12'" 10.22% 9.84% 
15.BO% 15.25% 18.83% 111.159':4, 17 .151% 
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0.09% 0.10% 
1983 1984 
1985 U88 "87 .1988 
157.35% 155.54% 155.78% 89.49%; 
'''.11% 14.89% 15.B3% 13.42~i 
10.95% 10.91% . 11.02% 10.50%: 
4 .BO% 4.82% 4.215% J . 91%i 
1.85% I.S5% 2.00% 1.155% 
0.85% 0.88% 0.81% 0 .77% 
O.t!% 0.21% 0.21% 0.19% 
0 .09% 0.08% 0.09% 0 .08% 
1985 1988 1988 
12.30-" 13.27% 13.47% 13.51% 
10.40% 9.78%9.99% 10.-40% 
17.75% 17.89% 17.59% 17.20% 
14.82% 15.57% 15.91% 15.83% 
13.0S% 15.27% 
11.31% 10. 25% 
17 .811% 18.27% 
15.43% - 15.304% 
1 ..... S% 13.19% 
12.111% . 13.05%; 
f4.88% 1-4 :29"10 
14.11% 13.5"% 
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Source: Survey of Industrial. Production, Various Issues 
managemen~ practices of the local entrepreneurs that inhibit the growth 
of firm size (Redding and Tam 1985). A more possible reason is the 
opening of the Special Economic Zones in Sbuth China whfch attracts a 
lot of investment from Hong Kong. Cheap and abundant labor supply and 
lowly priced land across the border cause the Hong Kong factory owners 
to partially abandon the bases '. in Hong Kong. Only very small 
establishments are left in Hong Kong which cater for purchasing, 
marketing and some minor processing. 
In terms of gro_ss output, the role of small factories is less 
I 
significant. There is · 35% of the total gross output is contributed by 
firms employing less than 49 persons in 1988 (it was 27% in 1978). About 
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47% of the total came from the firms that employed 50 t 'o 499 persons (. 
50% in 1978). However, if we follow the British standard, firms 
employing less than two hundred persons are small · (Dunnings 1979). If 
that is the case, 99% of Hong Kong factories are small and they take up 
about 62% of the total gross output. 
How probable it is for factories to obtain bank loans? We do not a 
hard and fast answers. Even the very small firms may be successful in 
dealing wi th o'anks. However, one thing can be sure. In Bri tain, the 
small firms (employing less than 200 persons) are ' said to be difficult 
to obtain bank loans (Dunning 1979) in spite of the more highly 
developed banking and financial sector is more elaborated and 
specialized. In Hong Kong, where the banking system is far less 
specialized, and the average firm size is much smaller. It is reasonable 
-
to infer that it may be even more difficult to obtain loans. It is a 
problem worth studying but so far, no existing research has directly 
handle this problem. In the last chapter, we have laid bare the bankers' 
set of calculation. Here we want to measure the industrialist against 
their standards. 
For . the not less desirable clients, ,securi ty- is a 'must for 
borrowing money from banks. As we have mentioned, machinery and ' goods 
are not good security for bankers. Usually, they do not take account of 
them. A better alternative is property. How~ver, for most of the Hong 
Kong industrialists, they do not have their own factory premises. 
According to the researches by Sit et aI, it is reported that three 
quarters of the small/ factories ' rented their premises (see Table 5.2). 
However, for the factories that owned their premises, a considerable 
proportion were still on mortgage. The actual proportion of factories 





Another study in Tuen Mun shows a higher rate of , ownership. Of the 
industrial units surveyed, 52% of the total _floor space is rented, 41% 
is owed with 7% being partially owned (Table 5.3). These rates are 
similar to the 1983 rates of 54%, 39% and 7% respectively (Tuen Mun 
study 1985). Itis reasonable for the latter study counts all industrial 
uni ts and the former one includes only the small and mediu'm size 
-
factories. Moreover, the latter counts 'floor space' rather than 
premises. 
Table 5.2 










Ownership of Factory PremIses in Tuen Mun. 





Source: Tuen Mun Survey, 1985 
52% " 7% 
54% 7% 
For the small and medium size factories, owing the business 
premises is difficult. On the one hand, the price of a premise is high 
enough. On the other, small firms often started with a very small ' 
proprietor fund. As Sit vividly put it, 
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Factory units of CFF [commercial flatted factory] are ofa 
minimize of 2 000 square fleet. Given this unit size, and a 
per square foot selling price of HK$100, an upper floor 
small unit would cost at least HK$200 000. It is beyond the 
initial proprietor fund of 95% of FID [factories in domestic 
premises] • ( Sit 19,83: 83) 
From the very beginning, the majority of the small firms do not~ 
own their factory premises. They can only pledge their own living 
apartment (if any) to banks if they want to make-any loans. 
How is - the financial condition of the majority of small and medium 
factories? Perhaps one can never have any definite answer to this ' 
, , 
question. It is because finance is the most sensitive issue for the 
factories owners. Various previous researches and the present writer's 
personal experiences confirmed that the factory owners are very 
reluctant to disclose their fin~ncialsituation. It makes resea~ch on 
this issue even impossible. Here, we may piece together the existing 
materials to build up a general picture of it. 
-As a banker expressed, a major problem exists for the small 
companies is that 
... in many cases, the executive knows little about accepted 
accounting procedures arid do not keep proper records or 
books of account, it makes difficulties, if not impossible 
to ascertain the state of companies' , finance ... This, in 
turn, create 'a vicious cycle when the executives wish to 
obtain financial assistance because any normal bank will 
require to assess the risk involved in its lending operation 
and in the absence of . accepted proof of potential borrower's 
operation and financial health, . it is unlikely to view loan 
propo~al with much ~compassion unless significant security 
can be offered to cover the loan - unlikely in the case of 
many small companies. (Chow 1985) 
Other bankers fotind 'the problem of small business are 
"understood" and banks generally will not discriminate them' if ' the ' 
.J 
firm 'is viable and business concentration is adequately managed' (HKIN 
1987). Another source also echoes that '[for the small factories] 
available security is few and the accounting system is ill managed', so 
III 
, • · a major obstacle to obtain bank finance' is that the financial ' 
statements ' cannot adequately reflect the standing of the firm. It 
prevent bankers from handling these cases' (Econol11ic Reporter 1987). 
All these comments . give us ·an impression that the financial 
management of small establishments are bad so that bankers would rather 
forgone that business. However, we cannot ignore it is possible in some 
cases the 'real' financial status to be acceptable but simply the record 
system fails to neatly capture the reality. Here, two questions are 
involved. First, the 'real' financIal status and second, the adequacy of 
the record system. For the former, again, we do not have any 'concrete 
data. In Sit and Wong's research (1989), some ideas can be grasped. : 
In their research, the large firms (both local and join-venture) 
were asked to evaluate-the specific quality aspects of the small and 
medium-sized industrial units in Hong -Kong (Table 5.4). The respondents 
were asked to assign a three point scale to different aspects of the 
small and medium-sized facto~i~s. The result shows that among the six 
aspects - management ., quality control, capital (adequacy), marketing, 
labor (supply), technology - capital (adequacy) is ranked the lowest by 
all the three categories of respond~nts. That is tosaYt all three 
gr6ups of the large firms found that capital (adequacy) is the worst 
aspect of small factories. This may not allow us to draw any definite 
conclusion, --but it is no ~ere accident that all three categories have 
, such a lowly evaluation of small firm. in this respect. 
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Table 5.4 
Assessment of SMI by Contractor Firms 
Quality Aspects Large Local Japanese Joint- Other Joint-
Firms ventures ventures 
Management 2.1 2.4 2.1 
Quality Control 1.9 1.8 2 
Capital (Adequacy) 1.7 1.6 1.8 
Marketing 1.8 2.6 - 1.9 
Labour (Supply) 1.8 2.4 2.2 
Technology 2 1.6 2 
Overall 1.9 2.1 2 
All units in assessment marks which range from 1 to 3 according to 
the scalEr 
3 (Good) ,2 (Fair) 1 (Bad) 









For the accounting system, Redding and Tam (1985) revealed that 
the local Chinese small firms are managed in a highly personalized 
manner. Particularized channels are used for information transactions 
among the managers and owners. I t makes formalized pro-cedures in 
recording and accounting redundant in intra firm communications. That is 
why probably 'researchers hardly ,find organizational charts, elaborate 
control forms, personnel ,records, company statistics other than very 
rudimentary account books and sale record in Chinese firms' (ibid:135). 
Moreover, they do not have the incentive to do so for most of the 
factories in ijong Kong are not limited dompanies. Up to 80% of them' are 
sole proprietorship and partnership (Table 5.5). They are not required 
in the law to produce annual audit financial report. If audit report is 
the most reliable documents for bankers, the majority of the factories 
cannot take adv~ntage of it. 
113 
Table 5'.5 
Ownership Status of Manufacturing E$tablishments in Hong Kong (%) 
Listed Companies Unquoted Listed Companies Sole Proprietorship Partnership 
No. No. No. No. 
1978 0.12 14.33 67.54 . 18.01 
1980 0.09 15.75 66.75 17.41 
1982 0.08 15.96 68.25 15.70 
1984 0.07 16.57 65.61 17.74 
1986 0.09 18.24 63.71 17.97 
1988 0.10 19.42 6Q38 20.10 
Source: Survey of Industrial Production, various years . 
Financial management and security are not the only unfavorable 
qualities of the small factories as borrowers. Local factories are 
situated in an environment that is full of uncertainty. A salient 
feature of Hong Kong industry that hinders borrowing is its dependency 
on export. · Fluctuation in export markets will directly shake the local 
t '\ 
productions. Moreover, lone major characteristic of Hong Kong's export 
trade is its high concentration on a narrow range of products which are 
highly geared to the needs of-the highly industrialized economies, 
particular the mass consumer markets of North America and Western 
Europe. Such high product and ,market concentration may well be a source 
of instability (Ho and Lin 1979). By examining th~ trade statistics of 
yarious periods, it is found that on the whole export earning as well as 
employment is expanding and is highly stable. HOlt/ever, despi te the 
stability <?f the relationship between export earnings and employment at 
both the aggregate and industry level, the variations are larger at the 
indtistry level~ 'Export proceeds and employment in Hong Kong's 
manufacturing industries were qonsiderably unstable over the years, ' but 
. / 
the variations tend to set each other riff so that they become highly 
stable for the manufacturing sector as a whole.' (Ho & Lin 1979:195). 
The aggregate stability is in fact the resultant of numerous booms and 
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bust at the industry level. 
Another research confirms' the ,above argument at a micro level. It 
is found that the manufacturing sector is highly fragmented. What can be 
done in one single firm ' in the United States may be processed by twenty 
firms in Hong Kong~ Every industrial firm deals with only a highly 
specialized process. To obtain order, they have to get along with 
merchandisers. 
Becaus.~ of detachment from the final market, there rarely is . 
any assurance of a stable market size. Under these 
circumstances, it is only natural that the average factory 
should tend to reach the optimal size for uncertainty 
absorption. (Redding andTam 1985:134) 
' That is why the ability to react quickly to changing external 
demands is important because the distribution and marketing are not 
under the control of manufacturers. For the factories in Hong Kong, they 
I 
are compelled to equip with the measures to buffer the shocking of 
external environment. Switching fast is the norm because the market is 
not stable. We can deduce that even the merchandisers are conditioned 
by the foreign buyers. Fluctuation in the foreign economy (or MFN, Bill 
301, etc.) will nevertheless ·.ruin the factory. Hong Kong manufacturers, 
according to the above arguments, are highly subjected to the turmoil in 
, , 
-, foreign market and they should constantly invent new strategies to cope 
with it. On the one hand, i~ can explain why the claims on upgrading on 
both prod-q.cts· and production, economics of scale, high-tech development 
often fail to materialize. Manufacturers do not aim at high end 
production, they will only bother about how to seize a share in the ever 
changing market. On the other hand, we should remember that bankers do 
not ~ appreci~te' rapid growth. For the rapidly changing market, the booms 
and busts are frequent (remember the excessive booming of electronic 
watches in the early eighties). Firms enter and exit in short inter~al. 
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From the banker's point of view, this is ' a difficult situation. If the 
business that bankers love to accommodate is the stable and steady 
trades, e.g., supermarket (especially the two giants in Hong Kong), the 
uncertain position of Hong Kong manufacturing industry is exactly what 
bankers feel insecure. 
In the above discussion, it is found that the manufacturing sector 
is disadvantaged in borrowing from · the banks. Most of them do not have 
their own premises. Their booking system and the capital adequacy are 
~ ., I' 
unfavorable. Their export-oriented character also makes .them directly 
expose to external fluctuation. 
11. FINANCE AND EARLY INDUSTRIALIZATION 
After discussing the_ likelihood for the Hong Kong manufacturers to 
I " 
obtain bank financing, ~n issue need~ some special treatment is the 
often mentioned high level of bank financing in Hong Kong's early 
industrialization. If we find the commercial banks- are not well equipped 
with the tools to lend to the manufacturers, the alleged higher level 
involvement of the banking sector during this early period is a 
potential anomaly. It is suggested that· the model of trust· IS applicable 
even in that period~ In this part, the role of early bank financing will 
be described first and then I ,will try to explain the 'anomaly'. 
Even before the Second World 'War, there had been a considerable 
scale of -industrial production ' in Hong Kong. It is commonly known that 
the shipbuildin'g industry occupied the dominant posi tion from the 
nineteenth century onward. Important additions to the industries during 
the l.atter part of the nineteenth century were two sugar refineries. 
During the World War One when supplies of European goods could not be 
obtained in the Far East, the small factories made a variety of products 
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such as towels, underwear, biscuits, perfumeries, cigarettes, metal 
goods such as enamel wares and t~rches. Particularly at the eve of the 
Second World War, war related products such as steel h~lmets, shovels, 
rubber boots, gas-masks, 'etc were produced in Hong Kong (Braga 1957:165, 
see also Leeming 1975). 
After the great war, an industrial revolution sparked off. A very 
-
rapid growth rate was achieved. One of the outstanding sector was cotton 
spinning. Berore the war, Hong Kong did not have any cotton spinning 
~ ~ l' 
mill. After the great war, the situation of China became highly 
uncertain. At the eve of the Civil War, the Shanghaineses started their 
search for refuges. Hong Kong was found to be most desirable, and 
substantial amount of capital and machinery were poured in Hong Kong in 
that period. 
It is difficult tb estimate ho~ much of this capital was 
channelled to cotton and textiles. Wong (1985:45) suggested that in and 
before 1948, the capital sunk "to the six newly established mills added 
up to HK$172 million. It includes the machinery used, spending on land, 
and all superstructure - the buildings. We may not equate the figure 
with actual figure for foreign capital inflow for it is possible that a 
certain proportion of it composed of local bank loans. After all, it is 
reasonable to conclude that a , substantial amount of capital was 
chanrielled to cotton and textile. New -machinery formed the bulk of the 
refugee capital. It is estimated that 200" 000 spindles were transported 
to Hong Kong, all new and modern (Wong 1988:47). 
Existing sources also show that the arrived cotton spinners had" 
obtained huge " amount of bank financing. From the figures provided by the 
Hong Kong government, in 1966 (the first year that bank statistics are 
available), loans to cotton textiles constituted 38% of all loans to 
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manufacturing industry. The item 'Textile' (cotton plus 'other') took 
about 50% of the manufacturing sector's total (see table 1.5). In Jao's 
estimation, (1970) the figures for Textile increased from HK$63200 in 
1955 to HK$484460 ten years later. Although we do not know the exact 
proportion of the total loans for use in Hong Kong, we may guess it 
should not be small. Jao added that 'it is inconceivable that the 
industry as a whole could have survived the many- crisis during ·the past 
two decades C~.he fifties and sixties] without adequate support' (Jao 
1970) . 
To account for the exact proportion of bank loans to. all invested 
capital would invalve too may guesstimation. I will nat try this here. 
Here, one may find that bank loans to the early industrialization, 
especially textile is important. It is further confirmed by a Chinese 
banker, who came from Shanghai in 1949 and had worked clasely with Hong 
Kong's industrialists, that · 
From the very beginning, Hong Kong's industries have been 
under-capitalized. Labor was plentiful and cheap, and profit 
margin were high. Industrialists 'made do' with the mInImum 
inv~stments and borrowed as much as they could fram the 
banks. They took out theJr profits for deposits or 
investment outside of Hong Kong. They did nat hesitate to 
grow in order to meet their markets' demands, but they 
financed as much of their growth as possible ·through bank 
credi t. · (Espy 1970: 137) 
It is perhaps an exaggeration to assert that without bank 
financing, ~?ng Kong post · war industrialization wauld not have taken 
\ 
place. N6netheless, it is fair ~to say that to reach the present scale of 
growth, banks loans have played a crucial role. Strictly speaking, it 
dealt mainly with textile. However, we must not forget that without Cthe 
flourishing c6tton industry, the related trades like g~rment making and 
weaving would not have grown into the present scale. If the whole · 
textile industry and its affiliate was the backbone of Hong Kong 
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f, 
manufacturing, it is fair to say that bank , financing has made marked 
.contribution to the industrial gro~th as a whole. 
It is a situation that needs some explanations because before ' the 
Second World War, parallel to the ethnicity segregation in social life, 
the commercial community was segregated too. The British banking houses 
were not interested in' the deposi ts and loans of the local Chinese. Even 
if they had to do business with the, local people~ they did it through 
compradores because members of the foreign bank staff were unqualified 
to judge the merits of the proposals that the Chinese put forward. For 
common ,local people, 'the HSBC ' w~s even lik~ a Chinese magistrate's 
court which the locals would avoid' (King 1991:349; Wong 1988:52). The 
query is, why local bankers, especially the large British banks, would 
lend to the newly arrived cotton spinners in such a scale? 
It is possible that after the Se~ond World War, the local economy 
as well as the banking sector was on the recovery. Bankers looked for 
business and the textile people looked for loans. They might also be 
, , 
encouraged by the government to give a helping hand to the economy 
(Economist- 1968). Apart from these factors, the previous proposed model 
of trust may work here. 
To trust; bankers would count on the ~ider environment, the firms' 
standing and the competence of , entrepreneurs. First of all, cotton 
spinning cannot be a small business. In early phase of Hong Kohg's 
industrialization, the whole tr~de was dominated by a handful of large 
establishment (about thirty). Apart from the shipyards, perhaps they 
were the largest industrial establishments. Owing to the rapid growth 
rate of textile industry, the ' local demand were satisfied within very 
little time. After that period textile products were exported. Partly 
due to the post war recovery, partly due to the fact that cotton is a ' 
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basic necessity, the industry experienced ' a big boom in the fifties to 
sixties. In 1960, it contributed to 54% of the total domestic export. No 
.' matter by which ~ndicator, textile was the most important and perhaps 
most profitable trade in Hong Kong. 
Secondly, the 'emigrant entrepreneurs' were the prominent economic 
elite in China. Perhaps they were the most enterprising people in China. 
There are grounds for believing that they were conversant with business 
skills. Moreover, they were the expert of bank financing. Before Western 
banking institutions were introduced into China, the merchants of lower 
Yangzi had already had financial institutions to cater ' for their own 
needs. 
Good standing and high profit margin would confirm bankers' trust. 
However, before any deals_ were made, bankers did not have these track 
records. Although the Shanghaineses entrepreneurs were the well known 
figures in China, it does not follow that Hong Kong bankers were 
familiar with them. The substantial amount of capital the entrepreneurs 
brought forth could be a proof of commitment, but not a proof of 
__ success. Here, even if. the post . war situation mature for industrialists 
(it is still questionable if we consider the unstable political milieu 
in that years); it did not guarantee that the two parties (bankers and 
spinners) would cooperate. The~e requires some triggering factors to 
start off the dynamics. At the beginning, the cooperation might not work 
in full string and the two sides might still he suspicious and 
tentative, nevertheless it is much better than no contact at ~ll. 
When the two parties were previously unfamiliar, trusting 
relationship could be ~~uilt, especially for the large amount of 
facilities the'Shanghainese looked for .and so little tangible securities 
they could offer. Here, the role of go-between is crucial. When the 
120 
trading partners are unfamiliar with each other, it needs an arbiter 
accepted by both sides. Not only to settle conflict, but to minimize the 
noise of communication. 
The first middleman was the China Engineers Ltd. For many years 
the China Engineers Ltd., backed by a major British banking house (it-
was said to be HSBC); supplied and financed machinery to all the leading 
mills in China. Even when the ~migrant spinners l~nded Hong Kong, they 
were still trading partners. The 'hong' (the China Engineers Ltd.) 
provided short term capital to manufacturers so as to ease their 
financial strains. Later, a 'pool' was de~eloped by thehong to provide 
facilities for ordering raw materials. It was said that the 'pool' was a 
beneficial policy for the spinners for it greatly mitigated the cash 
flow difficulties' (Gormersall 1957). In another source, ho~ever, it is 
reported that the hong (devised unreas9nable measures to make money (Dao 
Gong Bao 1957 Aug 2). In any case, the, hong was one of the early helper 
of Hong Kong textile (see also Wong 1988:187:188). 
Apart from the China Engineers Ltd, it is reported that a leading 
banker in Shanghai had came to, Hong Kong in 1949. 'He was a man with 
intensive financial experiences and contacts, a one-time manager of the 
Humai-Guiz-hon Railway, member of the committee on export control and 
the foreign exchangestabiliz?-tion found in 1947, as well as member of 
the Committee on Cotton Supply jointly established by the Chinese and 
American governments in 1949' (Wong 1988:118). This once leading banker 
acted as both the advisor of the Hong Kong bankers and entrepreneurs, 
I know these spinners personally, so I approached the 
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation on their behalf. 
We had ,to persuade the colonial official~ and the Bank that 
textiles were good for Hong Kong. It was not too difficult 
when they saw the financial side of it ... So I functioned as , 
an informal advisor for the Bank. I held a dinner on its 





Does , it mean that without the hong and the Chinese banker, Hong 
Kong textile and the related industry would not have been flourishing? 
Not exactly. We cannot ignore the possibility that the spinners 
deliberately searched for suitab~e agencies to deal with the banks. In 
fact, the role of that banker might be a resul t of that searches. One-~ 
thing we can be sure 'is that the go-between shortened social distance. 
It made bankers willing to lend despite the situations were not familiar 
, for them. Given the environment is ready, go between can spark off the 
dynamic. However, without the wider environment i.e. post war bloom, 
cheap labor, the cooperation might not be possible no matter how many 
middlemen available. 
For our model of trust, the above case is not an anomaly. Although 
the political environment was no so certain, the building blocks for 
growth - experienced entrepreneurs, c~pital, cheap labor and export 
market - were in place. The whole trade is highly concentrated in about 
thirty units. What "bankers faced 'were a handful of well trained managers 
and owners rather than three thousands grass root small firm owners. 
Moreover, -there were intermediaries to handled for the complexity of 
communications. It was a comfortable situations for bankers. 
From the above discussions, we learn lthat the large amount of 
'" 
small factories in Hong Kong ~re disadvantaged in borrowing. They may 
unable to meet the requirement of bankers. For the large and well 
established factories, like the cotton spinning mills, borrowing is not 
. ' 
difficult. This perhaps explains the contradictory claims that on the 
one hand, the industrialists· urged for more bank involvement and on the 
other hand, t .he bankers and some industrialists found the banking sector 
work very well. 
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CONCLUSIONS· 
My conclusions will be divided into two parts. Firstly,the 
foregoing discu~sion and its implications on the Hong Kong economy will 
be summed up. Then the theoretical implications of the study will be 
discussed ~. 
I. ON THE BANKING AND THE MANUFACTURING SECTORS 
From the very beginning· of its history, _ .there is no specialized 
I 
financial institution in Hong Kong to cater for the special needs of 
various sectors. To borrow from the formal channels, manufacturers 
- . 
should approach the commercial banks. On the one hand we find that, the 
commercial banks in general has not discriminated against the 
manufacturing sector . .In some cases, the dictum 'to borrow short, lend 
short' is even · violated to fulfil the needs of industrialists. On the 
other hand, there are complaints of insufficient aids provided by the 
banking sector. To make sense of this apparent paradox, the business 
practice of commercial banks are explored in this study to see how they 
\ handle the clients and why some manufacturers are not accommodated. 
Lending at any form involves predictions of the future, · In short, 
clients should be able to gain the trust of bankers. To gain trust, -
however, borrowers have to overcome a few barriers. Bankers will request 
security for it· is a possibility of sanction. Security alone is not 
enough because bankers are not inclined to make use of it to settle 
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· loans. Repayment ability is another important concern. We learned that 
repayment ability is not only a functiqn of personal characters, e.g . 
. prudence and honesty, but also highly related to the trades and the 
firms the borrowers take part in. To get familiar with the clients, 
bankers will deploy various means to scrutinize the standings of the 
clients at various levels i.e. individual level, firm level 'and the 
wider environment. Those who are familiar and acceptable from the 
bankers' point ,.9f view are subjected to less threat of sanction and vice 
versa. 
To protect their own interest, ' bankers will look for those having 
good reputation and experiences, good standing and safety trade. For 
those who fail to properly present ·themselves to the bank, no matter it 
is due to the communication blockade (no financial statements) or 
unsound financial status, bankers may just turn it down. 
It is also found that for any prudent bankers, they will not 
provide proprietor fund nor rescue dying firms. Owing to their lack of 
expertise and experience, they are not inclined to fund the production 
-- of pioneering products . and high~tech products. Some sources even 
indicated that in general the bankers are having so . little knowledge on 
manufacturing and thus that would rather direct money to other sectors. 
How the above findings help explaining for the low involvement of 
bankers in ma~~facturing sector? First of all, compared with other 
sectors, the manuf~cturing sector is disadvantaged. Bankers do not seem 
to have much knowledge in production. It makes loans to high end 
production difficult for the bankers are not expert in estimating the , 
riskiness. 
Moreover, machinery loans are difficult to obtain. In hire 
purchase loan, owing to the high depreciation rate of machinery, bankers 
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are actually not protected by the security (the machinery). It requires 
additional prosperity and familiarity, to make bankers trust. 
The characteristics of the manufacturing sector will also make 
bankers hesitate. The manufacturing sector -in Hong Kong is largely 
composed of small to medium-sized firms. It is not difficult to see wliy 
they are not welcomed. Past researches showed that first of all, very 
few of them own their premises. Offering security may be a problem for 
them. Their ~ "~. nancial situation is not satisfactory too. Another problem 
is that the manufacturing sector is supposed to be unstable due to its 
export-oriented character. Local firms are highly subjected t6 
fluctuation in export markets and that may -make the bankers refrain from 
borrowing. 
Compared with the other sectors, manufacturing is dis~dvantaged. 
For the bankers, they are more accustomed to the property, trading and 
security markets which require much less expert knowledge that are 
beyond the normal capacity of bankers. For property mortgage, all loans 
are against property. Security is not a problem. For the residential 
apartments, in particular, the~e has been no disastrous slump in Hong 
Kong (except during the 1967 riot) and the demand _is great. After the 
signing of the Sino-British Join Declaration, the property market keeps 
soaring as the amount of annu~l supply of land is restricted. Property 
for the common people is not only a basic necessity, it is an 
investment. Suchfavorable climate is good for both the property 
developers and owners to obtain loans. Public utilities are of course 
the most safety borrower for -the annual profit rates of utility 
.companies ar'e guaranteed by law. Trade financing is welcomed for it is 
safer and more profitable. Compared with other sectors, manufacturing, 
especially the small manufacturing firm, is in a serious disadvantage' in 
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obtaining bank loans. 
The discussion in the preceding chapters also explains why bankers 
refuse to lend to new establishments. It explains why bankers hesitate 
to lend to high end production. And it may also help explaining for the 
low involvement of bankers in manufacturing. Furthermore, the role of --
banking in early industrialization is also treated. 
-One of the weakness of the above discussions is that it fails to 
account for t~,e temporal fluctuation of loans to the manufacturing 
sector. After 1973, why bankers withdrew (in other sense, not to expand) 
from manufacturing? How to make sense of the ups and downs after the 
eighties? The present study cannot provide satisfactory answers. To 
explain the changes, one needs to investigate exactly what had happened 
in that_ period (both the manufacturing sector and the wider economy). It 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
This study is still far from offering a complete explanation for 
the low involvement- of banks in the manufacturing sector. As mentioned 
before, an 'industrial side agenda' is yet to be fully explored. We also 
have only some vague knowledge .on how bankers view the other sectors 
e.g. property. Without the comparison, it is not advisable to infer that 
bankers do not like ·to lend to manufacturing only. Here, we can only 
conclude tentatively that gi ve.n the present state of Hong Kong's 
industry, the commercial banks are not in a good position to provide 
financial help. 
Having this conclusion at hand, we may infer that if the present 
banking structure does not facilitate industrial growth, would it be the 
case ~hat the. present dilemma in manufacturing industry is an 
undesirable consequen~e of that banking practices? If industry obtains 
little assistance from banks, it is conceivable that a prolonged period ' 
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of capital accumulation is required for the ' firms to expand. To put 
forward this kind of argument, we should note that finance can be a 
, constraint of growth, but it should not be the only constraint. Land, 
labor, market and technology also mattered. From this angle, it follows 
that lacking finance is .a hinderance to industrial growth in the past 
but the extent of its influence is yet to be estimated. Again, to 
explain for the present dilemma, we cannot just sImply list variables 
such aslackin~." of finance, technology and labor. To achieve a deeper 
understanding one should have a detail anatomy of the industrial firms. 
We should see how they actually organize productions so that the ' weight 
of the constraints stated above can be adequately located. 
A more salient implication is on the future of Hong Kong 'industry. 
If we think that upgrading products and production is the hope of Hong 
Kong's manufacturing sect'orl, then we should look for a supporting 
system that can promote such change. The current large scale expansion 
of tertiary education can be viewed as laying down the infrastructure 
for future growth, while the actual work done is waiting to be measured . 
. For the present stat~ of art of ,the banking sector, it is doubtful 
whether it can ~~rv~ the needs of ,the high end productions. Not to 
mention the fun'dmanagement of commercial ban'ks that may hinder long 
term financing, whether the related banking staffs can accommodate the 
needs of high technology is still a question mark. Moreover, such a big 
move is a leap into uncertainty. ' Although it seems that hi-tech is the 
hope for Hong Kong manufacturing sector, in reality, no one can be sure 
whether' it would yield. The actual procedure to achieve upgrading is 
./ 
still unknown. ·. Overall speaking, it is an utterly unfamiliar situation. 
lThe word 'restructuring' is found to be too ambiguous. It is refrained from using 
here. 
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From the bankers' point of view, the move may imply too high a risk. It 
is not to the interest of any prudent bankers (and depositors) . . To 
expect the banking sector injecting finance in a large scale, we should 
, make a lot of changes to the present structure of the financial system. 
The possibility of such a change, however, is doubtful for the Hong Kong 
government does not seem to have the determination and means to 
restructure the banking sector. 
Perhaps j"t is one of the undesirable consequence of the 'hands-, 
off' policy. If there is no external intervention, every sector would 
run' on their own logic. It does not follow ' that they would finally reach 
an equilibrium and all parts are neatly knitted together. It is also 
possible that their operational logics might not match one another. 
I 
11. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The above study not only shows us the state of industrial 
financing in Hong Kong. It also sheds light on some important 
theoretical issues. 
The usefulness of the concept 'trust' is not restricted to 
analyzing lending. Undoubtedly, lending is a business that emphasizes on 
trust. However, almost all economic transaction involve a future 
dimension i.e. deals are not closed instantaneously. Actors need to 
predict the f~~ure conduct of their partner. Trust is an important 
consideration for most of the economic transactions. Through the concept 
of trust, we see that in reality, the considerations and actual 
operations of bankers are far -more complicated than the economists' 
conception. T~ust is the ~elationship 1) among actors and 2) between 
actors and the wider environment. From the onset, unlike the economistic 
·conception of man, the actors' are not atomistic. Rather, actors are 
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closely knitted with one another. We should note that they are not 
'forced' to come along with one another. It is to their own interest to 
stretch their social n~twork as far as possible, not only for 
approaching new clients, but also .as a source of information to evaluate 
them. Lending is difficult (if not impossible) for the atomistic actor~ 
Moreover, both the borrowers and lenders are situated in a .wider 
environment. The changes in the wider environment-will have effects on 
the micro le~el interaction. The micro interaction, nevertheless, is 
also corresponded with the wider context. In short, actors will refer to 
the micro and macro environment to make decisions. Here, we can see that 
economic actors are not, and should not be separated from social actors. 
Economic transaction is not happening in the ideal market which is 
separated from other social sphere. Rather~ they are interpenetrated 
with the social sphere. 'The 'social' and 'political' spheres are in fact 
the building blocks of economic actions. 
Moreover, what intervene in the evaluation process can be -the 
purely social variables e.g. reputation, ethnicity, If economic 
transacti6n is closely linked with social factors, then differential 
distribution of these social variables can have economic consequen~es . . 
Elaborated s06ial network, good reputation and cultural capital may not 
only be a symbol of success, ~ut also the means to achieve further 
success. It implies that when we talk about equality, it is far from 
enough t~ discuss it in terms 6f current income or asset value only. 
Future life chance is not only a matter of 'marketability', skill level, 
p:r'ofessional qualification or position in market. It is because the 
differently allocated social attributes will discriminate certain social 






The content of this concept could be more succulent than the 
argument in this thesis has demonstrated. It is suggested that two 
, , aspects of the concept can be further explored by future study. The 
first aspect is the relationship between trust and obligation. For some 
theorists trust is put on the agenda of social exchange and the related.-
obligation derived for 'exchange (Blau 1968, Coleman 1988, Scanzoni 
1979). In the previous discussion (see Chapter 2),-6bligation is 
conceived as a- function of sanction. Obligation, according to common 
- (' 
usage, means, binding agreement, indebtedness for service or benefit. 
' From the onset, i tis a form of 'vow' or 'testament'. We trust someone,. 
not only because of we are familiar with trustees, but also we find that 
they have the obligation to fulfill their 'duty' - they are obligated to 
do so. In the~e _ situations, future conduct of trustees is predictable 
(remember trust is the prediction of future). The source of obligation, 
that is, why someone will be 'obligated' to do something, is the 
possibility of sanction. 
There are two sources of obligation 1) the possibility of legal 
sanction arid 2) the possibility of moral sanction. Legal sanction as a 
condition of obligation is easy to understand. We also have had much " 
discussion on it. Moral sanction is another 60ndition ofobligatiorr. The 
statement 'you owe me' means someone is obligated to do something for 
the other. Otherwise, the 'fair deal'norm is violated and moral 
sanction will apply. In this study, moral 'obligation' is not explicit 
for it is difficult to research the exchange between bankers and 
industrialists. After all, it is malfeasance of some form. For other 
dealings, for ",example; transaction between merchandisers and factories, 
the gives and takes of "exchange, and the 'gift' offer~d by one or both 
sides (express services, discounts and spring dinner) may act as an 
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obligation - moral sanction in some form. ' If we find the Hong Kong 
manufacturers (as Redding and Tam .put it, see below) are largely working 
on an non contractual, informal and particularistic way, then these 
sorts of obligation relationship s~ould be important. How could these 
relations be cultivated and made use of will be interesting. Would it be 
the case, as Redding and Tarn suggested, that practices confined the · 
individual sizes of Hong Kong manufacturing factoii'es? However, before 
we probe this -line, one should have knowledge on the second query: 
trust and culture. · 
Any discussion on moral sanction should include an agenda for 
cultural study. It is because the constttution of moral sanction and its 
application are subjected to the cultural definition of that particular 
situ~tions. For example, the triads (the organized delinquency in Hong 
'i_I:. Kong) of the older generation highly v~lued yee hay (~~ ): the 
obligation between the 'brothers'. If brothers are betrayed, for 
instances, testified against by other brothers in court, ~he big 
brothers have the duty to 'do something' on the betrayer. The big 
brother are trustworthy even when there is no formal contract signed. 
For the new triads, -everyone is utilitarian and yee hay is no longer 
considered. An ' interesting result is, the insiders are more likely to 
testify against- brothers for self protection. Here, we can see that 
moral sanction, as a condition of trust, cannot be detached from the 
cultural context. 
In sociological literature, a pioneering research on small 
factories in Hong Kong that particularly enlightening is King and 
Leung's Chinese Touch - in Small Industrial Organization in Kwong Tong 
(1975). It is interesting because it vividly portraits how the tradition 
Chinese values on interpersonal relationship - obligation between 
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people, the proper behavior of a boss, and .trust - shape the management 
practices and shop floor politics . (see also Redding and Tam 1985). In 
this argument, 'culture' does notof~er socially accepted goal -
consumerism or asceticism ,- as in Weber's argument of Protestant 
ethics. Rather, it defines the proper behavior in certain situations 
e.g. when should one he charitable (see Swidler 1986). The point is, 
charitable act of a small factory owner will result' in some form of 
labor relations. Moreover, we can further ask how such orientation on 
trust makes formal arrangement redundant (e.g. strong moral sanction 
makes formal arraniement not necessary). Using this point of entry we 
can fuse cultural variables and profit..;.seeking behaviors. While it is 
still too early to predict how much the search will yield, we may be in 
a better position to bridge the 'economistic' and the 'sociological'. 
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EPILOGUE I 
The study of trust, for the present writer, is not only a 
theoreticale~ploration in a specific field of sociology. It may also 
delineate a predicament of life. A Chinese poet wrote: 'even for the 
life long friendship, the two partners may ~till leave their hands on 
their swords' handle.' ( 6' ~tf~ · ~v ~t~ ~tf j"i ) According to this 
poem, human being is inherently a disloyal species. In this study, we 
may see that human being is subjected to the constraints from various 
sources. While we value interpersonal ~rust, we may betray our partner 
for the pressure from other environmental force is great. Which 
dimension deserves primacy is difficult to tell. Perhaps the study 
offers a not so cynical perspective of man. However, it shows us that 
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